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Abstract
We study dynamic matching in exchange markets with easy- and hard-to-match agents. A
greedy policy, which attempts to match agents upon arrival, ignores the positive externality that
waiting agents generate by facilitating future matchings. We prove that this trade-off between
a “thicker” market and faster matching vanishes in large markets; A greedy policy leads to
shorter waiting times, and more agents matched than any other policy. We empirically confirm
these findings in data from the National Kidney Registry. Greedy matching achieves as many
transplants as commonly-used policies (1.6% more than monthly-batching), and shorter patient
waiting times (23 days faster than monthly-batching).
1 Introduction
We study how to optimally match agents in a dynamic random exchange market. Matching agents
faster reduces waiting times but at the same time makes the market thinner, leaving more agents
without a compatible partner. This trade-off naturally arises for kidney exchange platforms that
seek to form exchanges between incompatible patient-donor pairs.1 Waiting to match may increase
the number of patients receiving a kidney, but comes at a cost: receiving a transplant earlier does
not only improve the quality of life for the patient but also leads to substantial savings in dialysis
costs for society.2 In the last decade kidney exchange platforms in the United States gradually
∗We want to thank Mohammad Akbarpour, Aaron Bodoh-Creed, Yeon-Koo Che, Yuichiro Kamada, and Olivier
Tercieux for useful comments and suggestions. Ashlagi: MS&E, Stanford, iashlagi@stanford.edu. Nikzad: Eco-
nomics, University of California, Berkeley, nikzad@berkeley.edu. Strack: Economics, University of California, Berke-
ley, pstrack@berkeley.edu. Ashlagi acknowledges the research support of the National Science Foundation grant
(SES-1254768).
1For some early work on kidney exchange in static pools and the importance of creating a thick marketplace, see
Roth et al. (2007, 2004).
2The savings from a transplant over dialysis is estimated by over $270,000 (Held et al., 2016) per year over the
first five years.
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moved from matching roughly every month to matching daily.3 Practitioners are concerned that
this behavior, some of which is driven by competition between Kidney exchanges,4 is harmful, es-
pecially for the most highly sensitized patients.5 In contrast, kidney exchange programs in Canada,
Australia, and the Netherlands match periodically every 3 or 4 months (Ferrari et al., 2014).
This article analyses the trade-off between agents’ waiting times and the percentage of matched
agents in dynamic markets. We find that, maybe surprisingly, matching greedily minimizes the
waiting time and simultaneously maximizes the chances to find a compatible partner for all agents
for sufficiently large markets. We further quantify the inefficiency associated with other commonly
used policies like monthly matching using data from the National Kidney Registry.
To analyze this question we propose a stochastic compatibility model with easy-to-match and
hard-to-match agents. Easy-to-match agents can match with all other agents with a positive prob-
ability p, whereas hard-to-match agents can match only with easy-to-match agents with a positive
probability q. The main focus of our analysis is on the case where the majority of agents are
hard-to-match, which is inline with kidney exchange pools. This model captures two empirical
regularities of the patient-donor data from the National Kidney Registry (NKR): First, as the
market grows large, the fraction of patient-donor pairs that are matched in a maximal matching
does not approach 1, which is a consequence of the imbalance between different pairs’ blood types
in kidney exchange (Saidman et al., 2006; Roth et al., 2007).6 Second, as the market grows large,
the fraction of agents that cannot be matched in any matching goes to zero.7 Our parsimonious
two-type model captures the above regularities and no single-type model can account for both of
them (Propositions 1 and 2).
We study a dynamic model based on the above two-type compatibility structure in which easy-
and hard-to-match agents arrive to the market according to independent Poisson processes with
rates mE and mH . Agents depart exogenously at rate d. The market-maker observes the realized
compatibilities and decides when to match compatible agents. We evaluate a policy based on three
measures: match rate, matching time, and waiting time. The match rate is the probability with
which an agent is matched. The waiting time is the average difference between the time an agent
arrives and the time she leaves, either matched or unmatched. The matching time measures how
long an agent has to wait on average before being matched, conditional on being matched.
We start by analyzing the greedy policy, which matches every agent upon its arrival if possible.
3The National Kidney Registry (NKR) and the Alliance for Paired Donation (APD) search for matches on a daily
basis, whereas the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) search for matches twice a week.
4From personal communication with the kidney exchange directors.
5That is, patients who have common antibodies that will attack foreign tissue.
6See also Agarwal et al. (2018), who study a production function of a kidney exchange platform in order to quantify
the marginal benefits of different types of pairs and altruistic donors.
7A patient-donor pair cannot be matched in any matching if it cannot form a (two-way) exchange with any other
patient-donor pair due to biological compatibility.
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We first derive the distribution of the number of hard- and easy-to-match agents waiting in the
market in steady state. We find that, as the market grows large, many hard-to-match agents
will wait in the market for a compatible partner at any point in time. As a consequence, almost
every easy-to-match agent is matched with a hard-to-match agent immediately upon arrival and the
probability that an easy-to-match agent leaves the market unmatched converges to zero (Proposition
3). As their match rate is close to one and their waiting time is close to zero the greedy policy
is asymptotically optimal for easy-to-match agents in large markets. As hard-to-match agents are
incompatible with each other and almost every easy-to-match agent is paired with a hard-to-match
agent, greedy also maximizes the match rate of hard-to-match agents. Maybe less intuitively,
greedy-matching also minimizes the waiting time of hard-to-match agents compared to any other
policy when the market grows large (Proposition 4). We establish this result by first showing that
weakly more hard-to-match agents wait for a partner in any other policy. Then, we use a version of
Little’s law which implies that the average number of hard-to-match agents waiting in the market
is proportional to their waiting time. Together, this establishes that greedy matching will perform
weakly better than any other policy in a sufficiently large market.
The main challenge in the proof is analyzing the steady state distribution of a two-dimensional
random walk which keeps track of the number of easy- and hard-to-match agents waiting in the mar-
ket. Instead of analyzing the two-dimensional process directly —which is in general intractable—
we use coupling techniques to derive an upper and a lower bound on the marginal distribution of
hard-to-match agents. These bounds allow us to derive the distribution of the number of easy-to-
match agents waiting in steady state.
Next, we quantify the inefficiency associated with batching policies, which are commonly used
in practice. A batching policy periodically (e.g. monthly) matches as many agents as possible. We
derive a lower bound on the waiting time and an upper bound on the match rate under batching
policies. As the batching period gets longer the bound on match rate decreases and the bound on
the waiting time increases. Our bounds imply, that in a large market, greedy matching dominates
any batching policy, as it leads to strictly shorter waiting times and strictly higher match rates.
Quantitatively, our results imply that in a large market the match rate of any batching policy, for
both easy- and hard-to-match agents, is at most the match rate under the greedy policy minus
half the length of the batching period multiplied by the departure rate. For example if agents
exogenously depart on average after a year and the batching period is one month (i.e. 1/12 of a
year) the batching policy will match at least 1/24 = 4.2% fewer agents.
We also analyze the patient matching policy introduced by Akbarpour et al. (2017). This policy
assumes that agents’ exogenous departure times are observable. It matches an agent upon departure
if possible, and otherwise the agent leaves the market unmatched. We show that the patient policy
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leads to the same match rate as the greedy policy when the market becomes large. In both policies
almost all easy-to-match agents are matched almost upon arrival in a large market. We show that
hard-to-match agents wait longer (in first order stochastic dominance) under the patient policy
compared to the greedy policy. Quantitatively, the waiting time of hard-to-match agents under
the greedy policy equals the waiting time under the patient policy multiplied by
(
1 − mEmH
)
where
mE ,mH are the arrive rates of easy and hard-to-match agents. For example when 1/3 of the agent
are easy-to-match (i.e. 2mE = mH) hard-to-match agents will wait twice as long under the patient
policy.8
Finally, we test whether the large-market predictions of our model hold in data from the National
Kidney Registry (NKR). This data differs from our assumptions along two dimensions: first, because
of blood and tissue types it does not match our stylized two-type compatibility structure. Second, it
is unclear that the market is sufficiently large for our results to apply, because only a finite number
of agents arrive every year (around 360/year). Nevertheless, the data confirms the predictions of
our model (Section 4): As the market becomes large, the waiting and matching times of patient-
donor pairs who are “easier” to match approach 0, but the waiting and matching time of pairs
which are “harder” to match do not (c.f. Table 1).9 We further find that batching policies result
in no improvement to the match rate and lead to longer waiting times relative to greedy matching
(c.f. Table 1 and Figure 8). Lastly, under greedy matching, the waiting and matching times are
significantly lower than under patient matching. At the same time, we do not find systematic
differences between the match rates under greedy and patient matching (Figure 11 and Table 1).
1.1 Related literature
The most closely related literature studies dynamic matching on networks when agents’ preferences
are based on compatibilities, motivated by kidney exchanges. This literature was initiated by U¨nver
(2010). It is useful to organize this literature into two perspectives:
The papers taking the first perspective seek to minimize the waiting time of agents in the market
assuming that agents never depart exogenously. U¨nver (2010) analyzes a kidney exchange model
with linear waiting costs where compatibility is deterministically determined by blood type. He
finds that for pairwise exchanges, greedy matching is optimal.10 Anderson et al. (2017) consider a
model where compatibilities are based on a random graph model, in which each agent is compatible
with any other agent with some fixed probability. They find that greedy matching minimizes average
8The differences with Akbarpour et al. (2017) are discussed in detail in Sections 1.1 and 3.2.
9To capture the theoretical notions of hard-to-match and easy-to-match in our data set, we categorize patient-donor
pairs based on notions of “over-demanded” and “under-demanded” notions, as defined in Section 4.
10Further, using thresholds to facilitate three-way matchings is beneficial, but generates relatively small improve-
ments.
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waiting time, as the compatibility probability tends to zero.11 Ashlagi et al. (2016) add asymmetric
types to this random compatibility model where one type has a non-vanishing probability of being
matched with any other agent. In particular, in contrast to our model, any two types can potentially
match.12 They too find that greedy matching minimizes waiting time.13 This strand of literature
thus establishes in various models that greedy matching minimizes average waiting time.
The second perspective one could take to dynamic matching in kidney exchanges is to analyze
how many agents are matched. Akbarpour et al. (2017) consider a model with departures, in
which each agent is compatible with any other agent with some fixed probability. They find that
the patient policy leads to an exponentially smaller loss rate (i.e., fraction of unmatched agents)
compared to the greedy policy.
Each of the above perspectives studies one of two objectives: either to minimize the time until
an agent is matched or to minimize the number of agents that leave the market unmatched. Given
the different objectives the two perspectives lead to different conclusions about the optimality of
greedy and suggest a trade-off between matching agents quickly and matching as many agents as
possible. Our main contribution with respect to this literature is to study this trade-off and show
that it vanishes in large kidney-exchange markets with asymmetric agents.
Technically, our paper is the first to analyze a model with both exogenous departures and
heterogeneous agents and to also analyze the distribution of waiting and matching times, rather
than just averages.
From a modeling perspective there are two major differences between our paper and most of
the the above literature. First, compatibilities in our model depend also on the agent’s type (i.e.
donor’s blood type).14 Second, in contrast to Anderson et al. (2017) and Akbarpour et al. (2017)
we focus on markets, where the matching probabilities do not vanish. Their models intend to
capture sparse compatibility networks and small markets. In contrast we are interested in large
markets where the agents’ types are independent of the market size as arguably natural for kidney
exchanges. Whether a given market is approximated by either compatibility model depends highly
on the specific context, and is ultimately an empirical question. Our simulations reveal that kidney
exchange markets of even moderate size behave as predicted by our large market model.
Similar type of asymmetries across agents also appear in Nikzad et al. (2017). They are con-
cerned with a proposal for global kidney exchange, which incorporates international pairs to domes-
11Their results hold under different types of feasible matchings: pairwise, pairwise and three-way cycles, and chains.
12Note that types differ only by the probability to match with other agents.
13They also study the relationship between the balance in the market between types of agents and the desired
matching technology.
14One may interpret our model as combining both blood types and randomness due to tissue-type incompatibilities.
We note that Dickerson et al. (2012) develop a heuristic to approximate the full dynamic program and overcome the
infamous “curse of dimensionality.”
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tic kidney exchange pools. In their model, there is a continuum of international pairs who do not
get matched to each other and a continuum of domestic pairs who can get matched to each other
and to the international pairs. The compatibilities (between measures of pairs) are determined by a
“matching function”. They do a steady-state analysis to answer whether the savings from dialysis
can cover the surgery costs of international pairs.
The effectiveness of thickening the market by waiting to increase the number of matches has
also been studied in markets other than kidney exchanges. Liu et al. (2018) compare the match
rates of greedy and patient policies in ride-sharing markets for matching drivers with passengers
and find that “the patient algorithm may not necessarily generate more matches than the greedy
algorithm with heterogeneous compatibility at some parameterization.” Finally, recent and indi-
rectly, related papers study dynamic matching when agents’ have preferences that do not depend
only on compatibility. These papers find that greedy policies are inefficient (Baccara et al., 2015;
Doval, 2014) since some waiting can improve the quality of matches.15
2 The compatibility graph
A kidney exchange pool can be represented by a compatibility graph G. Each node in the graph
represents an agent (a patient-donor pair), and a link between two nodes exists if and only if the
two corresponding agents are compatible with each other (so a bilateral exchange between the nodes
is feasible). We restrict attention to bilateral exchanges.
A matching µ is a set of non-overlapping compatible pairs of agents. Denote by M(G) the set
of matchings in G.16 For every compatibility graph G let |G| denote the number of agents in the
graph, and for every matching µ let |µ| denote the number of agents in that matching.
Define the (normalized) size of the maximum matching (SMM) in a graph G to be the fraction
of matched agents in a maximum matching:
SMM = max
µ∈M(G)
|µ|
|G| .
Define the fraction of agents without a partner (FWP) to be the fraction of agents that are not
matched in any matching (thus have no compatible agent):
FWP =
|{i ∈ G : (i, j) /∈M(G) for all j}|
|G| .
15See also related results in queueing models (Leshno, 2014; Bloch and Cantala, 2016).
16The paper restricts attention to matching only pairs of agents and not through chains. For the effect of matching
through chains see, e.g., Ashlagi et al. (2011) and Anderson et al. (2017).
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Figure 1 depicts the average SMM and FWP for randomly drawn subsets of the patient-donor
population acquired from the National Kidney Registry (NKR), the Alliance for Paired Donation
(APD), and the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). This data includes 4132 patient-donor
pairs. Two features stand out: first, even as the pool grows large, the size of the maximum matching
stays bounded away from 1, i.e., SMM < 1. This is a natural consequence of the different blood
types (Roth et al., 2007). Second, when the market grows large, the fraction of pairs that have no
compatible pairs decreases. Roughly 8% of pairs are incompatible with any other pair in this data
(this is the FWP).17 Since compatibility depends only on the characteristics of the patients and
donors, it is independent of pool size, and thus in a sufficiently large pool one would expect that
the FWP would further decrease to zero.
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SMM FWP SMM FWP
Figure 1: The average fraction of patient-donor pairs without a compatible partner in blue and
the (normalized) size of the maximum matching in red, for a random subset of patient-donor pairs
from NKR, APD, and UNOS data.
Fact 1. As the kidney exchange patient-donor pool grows large, the compatibility graph (Figure 1)
is such that the size of the maximal matching (SMM) stays bounded away from 1 and the fraction
of patient-donor pairs without a compatible partner (FWP) goes to 0.
The change in both the SMM and FWP measures captures the benefit of a larger market. Since
a matching policy in a dynamic environment trades off the benefits of a larger market with the
waiting costs incurred by the agents, having a model that accurately represents the SMM and the
FWP is important to correctly describe the costs and benefits of waiting to match.
17In practice some patients can receive a kidney from blood-type incompatible donors due to advanced technology.
For the sale of simplicity we ignore this in our simulations, but it is worth noting that the FWP drops to roughly 4%
when this form of compatibility is allowed.
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2.1 A compatibility model
To capture the features of kidney exchange identified in Fact 1 we adopt a stylized and tractable
model with random compatibilities. There are two types of agents, easy-to-match or hard-to-match,
denoted by E and H, respectively. There are more hard-to-match than easy-to-match agents. Any
pair of hard-to-match and easy-to-match agents are compatible independently with probability
p > 0, any pair of two easy-to-match agents are compatible independently with probability q > 0,
and no pair of hard-to-match agents are compatible with each other (see Figure 2).
Easy to Match Hard to Match
q
p
Figure 2: The random compatibility model.
Proposition 1 shows that this simple model is indeed able to capture the features of real kidney
exchanges identified in Fact 1:
Proposition 1. Consider a compatibility graph with m easy-to-match agents and (1 + λ)m hard-
to-match agents where λ > 0. Compatibilities between pairs of agents are generated as described in
Section 2.1. As m grows large the SMM goes to 22+λ and the FWP goes to zero almost surely:
lim
m→∞ SMM =
2
2 + λ
, (1)
lim
m→∞FWP = 0 . (2)
That the size of the maximal matching cannot exceed 22+λ is intuitive: since H agents cannot
match with each other and there are more H agents than E agents, some H agents must remain
unmatched when the pool is large. An upper bound on the fraction of agents that can be matched
equals twice the fraction of E agents 12+λ . Furthermore, note that this fraction is achieved whenever
there exists a matching, in which all E agents are matched with H agents. It follows from a standard
result in random graph theory that the probability that such a “perfect matching” exists approaches
1 as the pool grows large. Furthermore, as the pool grows large any H agent will be compatible with
some E agent, since compatibilities between agents are drawn independently. Thus, the fraction of
agents without a partner converges to 0.
The parameter λ of the model measures the degree of imbalance between hard- and easy-to-
match agents. So λ = 0 corresponds to a balanced pool. Figure 1 suggests that the size of
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the maximal matching in the national kidney exchange data converges to roughly 60% when the
pool becomes large, implying that λ ≈ 1.33 in the context of our model. This reduced-form
calibration is roughly consistent with a value of λ ≈ 1.33 that one obtains for the same data
when defining hard-to-match agents directly as those who cannot match with each other due to
blood-type incompatibilities (see Section 4).
Proposition 1 establishes that our two-type model can match the empirical behavior of the SMM
and FWP measures. Proposition 2 establishes that no model with a single type can replicate the
empirical features of real kidney exchanges observed in Fact 1, even when allowing the probability
of compatibility between two agents to depend on the market size in arbitrary ways.
Proposition 2. Consider a model with m homogeneous agents, in which every pair of agents are
compatible independently with probability p(m) > 0 that may depend on the market size. The
following two conditions cannot be satisfied simultaneously almost surely:
lim
m→∞ SMM < 1, and (3)
lim
m→∞FWP = 0 . (4)
The proof of Proposition 2 is constructive. It begins with assuming that every agent has a
compatible partner when the pool grows large, i.e., that (4) is satisfied. It then constructs an
algorithm which selects a single matching for any given compatibility graph and proves that the
matching selected by this algorithm will include all agents with high probability as the pool grows
large. This implies that (3) and (4) cannot be simultaneously satisfied in any random graph model
with homogeneous agents.
Economically, this observation implies that heterogeneity of agents plays a major role in kid-
ney exchanges.18 Our two-type model is arguably the simplest random compatibility model that
captures these features of the compatibility graph.
3 Dynamic matching
3.1 Model
We embed the static compatibility model from Section 2.1 in a dynamic model to allows to study
matching policies in a dynamic setting. We consider an infinite-horizon dynamic model, in which
agents can match bilaterally. Easy-to-match agents arrive to the market according to a Poisson
process with rate m, and hard-to-match agents arrive to the market according to an independent
18This is consistent with Roth et al. (2007) and Agarwal et al. (2018), who demonstrate that the types of patients
and donors play a crucial role for efficiency.
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Poisson process with rate (1 + λ)m. We assume that the majority of agents are hard-to-match,
that is λ > 0, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
An agent that arrives to the market at time t becomes critical after Z units of time in the
market, where Z is distributed exponentially with mean d, independently between agents. We refer
to d as the exogenous departure rate, or departure rate for the sake of brevity. The latest time an
agent can match is the time she becomes critical, t+Z; immediately after this time the agent leaves
the market unmatched.
Matching policies. Denote by Gt the compatibility graph induced by the agents that are present
at time t. A dynamic matching policy selects at any time t a matching µt ∈M(Gt), which may be
empty. Whenever a non-empty matching is selected, all matched agents leave the market.
Several kidney exchange platforms in the United States typically match in a greedy manner,
attempting to match a patient-donor pair as soon as it arrives to the market (see Ashlagi et al.
(2018)). A tractable approximation of this behavior is a greedy matching policy.
Definition 1 (Greedy). In the greedy policy an agent is matched upon arrival with a compatible
agent if such an agent exists. If she is compatible with more than one agent, H agents are prioritized
over E agents and otherwise ties are broken randomly.
Some platforms identify matches periodically (thus less frequently than a greedy matching pol-
icy), allowing the pool to thicken and possibly offer more matching opportunities. For example,
UNOS matches twice a week, whereas national platforms in the United Kingdom and the Nether-
lands identify matches every three months (Biro et al., 2017). This behavior is approximated with
the following batching policy.
Definition 2 (Batching). A batching policy executes a maximal match every T days. If there are
multiple maximal matches, select randomly one that maximizes the number of matched H agents.
The last policy we consider is a patient matching policy, proposed by Akbarpour et al. (2017),
which attempts to match an agent only once she becomes critical. In the context of kidney exchange
this means that two patient-donor pairs in the pool are matched only if the condition of one of
these pairs is such that it cannot match at a later point in time for medical or any other reason.19
Definition 3 (Patient). In the patient policy an agent that becomes critical is matched with a
compatible agent if one exists. If she is compatible with more than one agent, H agents are prioritized
over E agents, and ties are broken randomly.
19Such a policy is practical if the times at which pairs become critical are observable.
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Observe that the greedy and patient policies match at most two agents at any given time because
no two agents ever arrive or become critical at the same time. The batching policy, however, can
match multiple agents in a given period.
Measures for performance. To study the performance of a matching policy we focus on two
measures. One is the match rate of each type Θ ∈ {E,H}, which is the fraction of agents of type Θ
that match at the steady state. The other is the expected waiting time (or simply waiting time) an
agent of type Θ spends in the market, whether eventually matched or not. For type Θ ∈ {H,E}
we denote its match rate by qΘ and its expected waiting time by wΘ, where the policy will be
clear from the context. Another measure we analyze is the matching time of a type Θ, which is the
average time agents of type Θ who eventually match spend in the market.
In kidney exchange the match rate corresponds to the probability of exchanging a kidney with
another patient-donor pair. Because waiting for a kidney is often spent on dialysis, which is costly
(both financially and physically), these quantities have a direct impact on welfare.
We are interested in optimal policies for large pools. Formally, we consider the following notion
of optimality:
Definition 4 (Asymptotic optimality). A policy is asymptotically optimal if for every  > 0
there exists an m? such that if the arrival rate is large m ≥ m?, every type of agent improves its
match rate and expected waiting time by at most  when changing to any other policy.
This optimality notion is demanding, since it requires the policy to be optimal for every type of
agent simultaneously. It is unclear whether an asymptotically optimal policy exists, since a policy
that is optimal for H agents might be suboptimal for E agents.
3.2 Results
In this section we present the main result of the paper and discuss its implications. We discuss
the logic underlying the results in Section 3.3. The main finding is a characterization of the match
rates and waiting times associated with the greedy, batching and patient matching policies.
Theorem 1. The greedy policy is asymptotically optimal, whereas the batching and patient policies
are not asymptotically optimal.
We further compute the match rates and expected waiting times under these policies.
Proposition 3. As the arrival rate m grows large:
(i) The match rates of hard- and easy-to-match pairs under greedy approach (qGH , q
G
E ) = (
1
1+λ , 1),
respectively, and their expected waiting times approach (wGH , w
G
E) = (
λ d
1+λ , 0).
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(ii) The batching policy, which matches every T periods, achieves match rates of at most (qBH , q
B
E ) =
( 1−e
−T/d
(1+λ)T/d ,
1−e−T/d
T/d ). Furthermore, the expected waiting and matching time for each type
Θ ∈ {E,H} is at least wBΘ = d(1 − qΘ). Also, qBΘ < qGΘ, whereas qBΘ approaches qGΘ as T
approaches 0. In addition, wBΘ > w
G
Θ, whereas w
B
Θ approaches w
G
Θ as T approaches 0.
(iii) The match rates of hard- and easy-to-match pairs under the patient policy approach 11+λ and
1, respectively, and their expected waiting times approach d and 0, respectively.
Figure 3 illustrates the match rates and waiting times of H and L agents under the different
policies as found in Theorem 3.
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Figure 3: Illustration of Theorem 1 when there are twice as many hard-to-match agents as easy-
to-match agents (λ = 1.33) and expected departure time is 360 days. The blue dots represent the
predictions of our model as the arrival rate goes to infinity.
In Figure 3 we calibrated the model such that it matches the data from the National Kidney
Registry, where agents depart on average after 360 days and λ ≈ 1.33. As Figure 3 illustrates, the
batching policy leads agents to wait longer and get matched with a smaller probability than under
the greedy approach. The losses resulting from this are substantial. For example, under a monthly
batching policy hard-to-match agents wait on average 6 days and easy-to-match agents 15 days
longer and get matched with 1.7% and 4% lower probability. Similarly, the patient policy matches
equally many agents as the greedy policy, but leads to a substantially longer expected waiting time
for hard-to-match agents (155 more days).
We now provide a rough intuition for the differences among greedy, batching and patient match-
ing policies. In Section 3.3 we provide a more precise intuition and a sketch of the argument for
the various parts of the results. As there are more hard- than easy-to-match agents, hard-to-match
agents will accumulate and a large number of them will be present at any time under any policy.
This implies that under greedy matching, easy-to-match agents will have upon arrival, with high
12
probability, a compatible hard-to-match agent and are therefore matched immediately. As a con-
sequence, every easy-to-match agent is matched with a hard-to-match agent, which implies that
greedy matching asymptotically achieves the optimal match rate.
Under the batching policy each agent waits at least from the time of her arrival until the
next time a matching is identified. Thus each agent waits on average at least half the length of
the batching interval. Furthermore, each agent departs during that time with strictly positive
probability. Thus, easy-to-match agents are worse off under the batching policy than under the
greedy policy where they get matched immediately with probability 1. As some easy-to-match
agents leave the market unmatched, hard-to-match agents are matched with a smaller probability.
Consequently there are, on average, more hard-to-match agents waiting in the market. Little’s
law, which states that the arrival rate multiplied by the average waiting time equals the average
number of waiting agents, implies that hard-to-match agents also wait longer under any batching
policy than under a greedy matching policy. As both types are worse off, batching policies are not
asymptotically optimal.
By analyzing the dynamics of the market we show that under patient matching, so many hard-
to-match agents accumulate that an easy-to-match agent will match, with high probability, with a
critical hard-to-match agent almost immediately upon arrival. This implies that patient matching
asymptotically achieves the optimal match rate. As hard-to-match agents get matched only when
they become critical, the distribution and expectation of their waiting time is the same as if they do
not match at all. Hence, hard-to-match agents get matched faster under a greedy policy, implying
that patient matching is not asymptotically optimal.
Finally, observe that the smaller the imbalance in the market, the faster hard-to-match agents
match under the greedy policy. Under patient matching, however, the waiting time distribution of
hard-to-match agents is independent of the market imbalance. So as mHmE approaches 1, the ratio
between the average waiting times under patient and greedy matching policies approaches infinity.
Remark 1. For completeness, we prove in Appendix G a counterpart for some parts of Theorem
1 for the empirically irrelevant case λ < 0. In that appendix we establish the intuitive fact that,
when the majority of agents are easy to match, the expected waiting and matching times approach
0 under both greedy and patient matching policies as the market size m approaches infinity.
Remark 2. Akbarpour et al. (2017) find, in apparent contrast to our results, that patient matching
performs better than greedy matching. The difference stems from a combination of two factors.
First, in their model, there is a single type of agent. Second, the likelihood that two agents match
vanishes in the arrival rate as p(m) = cm for some constant c > 0. We set the likelihood of matching
to be independent of the size of the market and allow for agents to have differing abilities to match
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with other agents (in line with the empirical structure of kidney exchanges – recall Proposition 1
and Proposition 2).
A further difference is that Akbarpour et al. (2017) measure the ratio between loss rates of
different matching policies, whereas we are interested in the match rate.20 Analyzing the match
rate allows us to show that greedy matching is an asymptotically optimal policy whenever the
agent has risk-neutral expected utility preferences. While the ratio between loss rates is an intuitive
measure it has no direct relation to expected utility preferences.
3.3 Discussion of results
In this section we provide a proof sketch for the various parts of Theorem 1 and Proposition 3 as
well as additional results on the matching time distributions. It is useful to first establish an upper
bound on the performance of any policy.
Proposition 4 (Upper bound on the performance of any policy). For any  there exists m such
that for any market size m > m and any policy the match rate of H agents is at most
1
1+λ +  and
the expected waiting and matching time is at least λ d1+λ − .
Proposition 4 is shown by considering the hypothetical situation where each E agent can match
with any H agent and thus in a large market no E agent remains unmatched. Since H agents cannot
match with other H agents, this provides an upper bound on the probability of an H agent being
matched, which is at most the ratio of E to H agents, 11+λ .
3.3.1 Greedy matching policy
Next we analyze the performance of greedy matching as the market grows large. The following
proposition includes the results in the first part of Proposition 3.
Proposition 5 (Performance of the greedy matching policy). Consider the greedy policy as the
market grows large (m → ∞). The match rate of H agents converges to 11+λ and the waiting and
matching times converge to an exponential distribution with mean λ d1+λ . The match rate of E agents
converges to 1 and their waiting and matching times converge to 0.
We first provide intuition for the waiting time distribution. Consider greedy matching in a
deterministic setting where every E agent is compatible with every H agent, and agents arrive and
20In our model, as the market grows large, the ratio between the loss rates under the greedy and patient matching
policies approaches 1 as does the ratio between the match rates. Their model, however, predicts an exponential ratio
between the loss rates, with the exponent being proportional to the average degree of the compatibility graph. As the
average degree grows larger, the ratio between loss rates grows. However, the ratio between match rates approaches
1. (Loss rates under both policies approach 0 and match rates approach 1.)
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depart deterministically. In this setting E agents will be matched upon arrival with H agents.
This means that there will be no E agents waiting in the market, and their waiting time equals
zero. Denote by x the steady state number of H agents present in the market. Per unit of time,
(1 + λ)m H agents arrive to the market and m of them are matched with E agents. Further, xd
of the waiting agents are expected to depart unmatched per unit of time. In the steady state the
number of departing agents equals the number of unmatched arriving agents. Thus, x solves the
balance equation
x
d
= λm ⇒ x = λmd .
Thus, if the matching partner for an E agent is chosen at random, each H agent has a probability of
m
λmd =
1
λ d of being chosen per unit of time. The time at which a never-departing H agent would be
matched is therefore exponentially distributed with rate 1λ d . The time until an H agent departs the
market is exponentially distributed with rate d. Since the minimum of two exponentially distributed
random variables is again exponentially distributed with rate equal to the sum of the rates, the
waiting time of an H agent is exponentially distributed with rate 1λ d +
1
d =
1+λ
λ d , and thus with
mean λ d1+λ .
The formal proof of Proposition 5 is more complex. The main idea is to show that for a
sufficiently large market m the steady state of the model with random compatibilities is close to
the steady state of the model where every E agent is compatible with every H agent and agents
arrive and depart deterministically. Our results can thus also be understood as a motivation for
studying deterministic models. To show this approximation, consider the number of waiting H
agents at time t, denoted by xt, and the number of waiting E agents, denoted by yt. We show
that under greedy matching (xt, yt)t is a two-dimensional continuous-time Markov process.
21 We
derive the fixed-point equation, which characterizes the steady state distribution of this process
and show that it admits a unique solution. We then prove that the stationary distribution must
have exponential tails, and the rate at which the density of the stationary distribution decays in
the tails shrinks at least at a rate proportional to 1√
m
. We use this to show that the steady-state
number of E and H agents in the market is not more than a factor of
√
m away from the solution
for the fixed-point equation. As this distance grows slow relative to the market size, the random
fluctuations of (x, y) are well approximated by their expectations which correspond to the dynamics
of the deterministic setting described earlier. A complication in this analysis is the two-dimensional
nature of the stochastic process (x, y), which requires analyzing some auxiliary problems that we
describe in detail in the appendix.
Next, we explain why the matching time of H agents follows the same distribution as their
21See also Ashlagi et al. (2019), who analyze a two-dimensional Markov chain.
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waiting time. Consider an arriving H agent. Let td be the (random) departure time for this agent.
Let tm be the time at which the agent would be matched with another agent, assuming that the
agent never departs. The waiting time of h then is t = min{td, tm}. The conditional distribution
of the minimum of two independent exponential random variables td, tm is independent of which
one is smaller.22 Thus, the matching time tm of H agents has the same distribution as t.
As Proposition 5 shows, greedy matching achieves the upper bound derived for arbitrary policies
in Proposition 4 and we conclude that greedy matching is asymptotically optimal.
3.3.2 Patient matching policy
We next quantify the performance of patient matching policy. The following proposition includes
the third part of Proposition 3.
Proposition 6 (Performance of the patient matching). Consider the patient policy when the pool
grows large (m→∞). The match rate of H agents converges to 11+λ and the waiting and matching
time converge to an exponential distribution with mean d. The match rate of E agents converges to
1 and their waiting and matching times converge to 0.
To get a rough intuition for this result, again consider the hypothetical case where all H and
E agents can match and agents arrive deterministically. There exists a steady state under the
patient policy such that there are no E agents in the market and the number of H agents in the
market is approximately (1 + λ)md. The reason this is a steady state is as follows. H agents get
critical and attempt to match with E agents at a rate of (1+λ)mdd = (1 + λ)m, whereas E agents
enter the market only at rate m. This means that E agents are matched immediately and the
steady-state number of E agents in the market remains zero. Since no E agent becomes critical,
there are no H agents who are matched with a critical E agent. Thus, H agents depart at the rate
(1+λ)md
d = (1 + λ)m and arrive at the rate (1 + λ)m, which implies that this is a steady state. A
standard argument implies that the steady state is unique. Since H agents are the ones that initiate
matches, their average waiting time equals the average time d until they depart exogenously. By
the same argument given for greedy matching it follows that the waiting and matching times have
the same distribution.
The main technical difficulty in proving Proposition 6 is the same as in the proof Proposition
5; we need to approximate the stochastic process describing the number of waiting E and H agents
22That is, for any z > 0, P
[
tm < z
∣∣tm = t] = P [t < z] . This holds because
P
[
tm < z
∣∣tm = t] = P [min{t < z, tm = t}]P [tm = t] = P [t < z] · P [tm = t]P [tm = t] = P [t < z] .
The second equality follows from the fact that the events t < z and tm = t are independent, which holds because
td, tm are independent exponential random variables.
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with a more tractable process and prove that the steady state of this approximation converges to
the steady state of the heuristic model discussed above when the market becomes large.
3.3.3 Batching policy
Figures 4 and 5 graphically compare the bounds provided by Proposition 3 on the match rate and
waiting times of H agents under the batching policy to the match rates and waiting times of H
agents under the greedy and patient matching policies.
Figure 4: Upper bound on the match rate
of H agents under the batching policy when
λ = 1.
Figure 5: Lower bound on the waiting time
of H agents under the batching policy when
λ = 1.
The bounds given by Proposition 3 for H agents are derived by analyzing a simpler stochastic
process in which (i) easy-to-match nodes are not compatible, and (ii) the probability of compatibility
between an easy-to-match and a hard-to-match node is 1. A straightforward coupling exercise shows
that the match rate of H agents is larger in the simplified process than in the original process and
their waiting time smaller. This allows us to analyze the simplified process instead of the original
process. The bounds that we derive this way are in fact tight (up to vanishing factors) for the
original process as well.23 Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the convergence of these bounds to those for
the greedy policy (given in Proposition 5) as T approaches 0.
The bounds given in Proposition 3 for E agents are calculated simply based on the fact that
an arriving E agent should wait until the next matching period and may not get matched if she
becomes critical before that. The bounds for E agents also are tight for the original process and
approach to those of the greedy policy as T approaches 0.
23This can be proved formally using proof techniques similar to the ones we used to analyze the greedy matching
policy.
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3.4 On convergence rates and the effect of market imbalance
In the previous section we have shown that greedy matching is optimal when the market is large.
Here, using simulations, we (i) explore the convergence of match rates and waiting times under
greedy matching as the market grows large for a fixed λ, and (ii) demonstrate that greedy matching
is also optimal in small imbalanced markets with a large share of hard-to-match agents.
Figure 6 plots the match rates for both types of agents and the matching and waiting times
for a fixed λ = 1 while varying the arrival rate m. Observe that the measures converge quickly
to their limit value as m increases (note that the theory predicts that in the limit one half of the
hard-to-match agents are matched).
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
0.1 0.6 1.1 1.6 2.1
arrivals per day, λ=1
H match time H wait time E match time
E wait time H matched E matched
Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis over the arrival rate m for the greedy matching policy. λ is set to
1 and agents depart (exogenously), on average, after 360 days. The arrival rate in the NKR data
is roughly 1. The left y-axis represents times in days and the right y-axis represents the fraction
matched.
Figure 7 illustrates the optimality of greedy matching in small imbalanced markets. It plots the
same measures as we will see in Figure 6, but this time we fix a small arrival rate m = 0.25 and
vary the imbalance parameter λ. We observe that the average number of matches for both types
of agents quickly converges to their upper bound as the imbalance parameter λ increases.
To gain some intuition about the effect of imbalance on the optimality of greedy matching, it is
useful to consider the loss ratio of a policy, defined to be 1 minus the ratio of the expected number
of agents matched under that policy per unit of time to the expected number of agents matched
by the omniscient policy per unit of time.24
24The omniscient policy has access to the whole sample path of the stochastic process, involving arrivals, departures,
and compatibilities, and therefore makes the maximum number of matches.
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Figure 7: Sensitivity analysis over the imbalance λ for the greedy matching policy. m is fixed to
0.25 per day and average days in the pool is 360.
We argue that the loss ratio under greedy matching can be bounded by O(e−pλm/2), which
approaches zero exponentially fast in the imbalance parameter, λ. The key observation is that
the steady-state distribution of the number of H agents in the market first-order stochastically
dominates the Poisson distribution with parameter λm. (This can be verified by a straightforward
coupling argument.) Standard tail bounds of the Poisson distribution imply that, upon the arrival of
an E agent, the probability that the number of H agents in the market is at least λm/2 is O(e−λm).
Conditioned on having at least λm/2 H agents in the market, the chance that an arriving E agent
does not have a compatible H agent is bounded by (1 − p)−λm/2 ≤ e−pλm/2. A union bound then
implies that the probability that an E agent is not matched with an H agent, and therefore the loss
ratio, is bounded by e−pλm/2 + e−λm = O(e−pλm/2).
4 Empirical Findings
While we have formally shown that greedy matching is optimal in a large or imbalanced market,
whether real markets are sufficiently large or imbalanced for this prediction to hold is ultimately
an empirical question. To address this question we complement our theoretical findings with sim-
ulations using comparability data from a real kidney exchange platform (the National Kidney
Registry, or NKR). These simulations indicate that greedy matching dominates the batching and
patient policies even in relatively small markets. We further provide small market simulations based
on the stylized model (and not real data) in Appendix H, which also indicate that greedy matching
outperforms other commonly used policies.
The data from the NKR includes 1364 de-identified patient-donor pairs from July 2007 to
December 2014 (the focus of the paper is on bilateral matching and we therefore ignore altruistic
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donors in the data). The data includes patients’ and donors’ blood types and antigens as well the
antibodies for each patient, which allowed us to verify (virtual) compatibility between each donor
and each patient. On average, approximately one patient-donor pair arrives per day to the NKR,
and the average exogenous departure time of a pair is estimated to be 360 days.25 We note that
our simulation results are very similar when merging the APD, UNOS, and NKR data.
In our simulations, arrivals of patient-donor pairs to the pool are generated by a Poisson process
with a fixed arrival rate. Arrival rates are varied from 0.01 to 4 pairs per day, capturing market sizes
from one-tenth to four times the size of the NKR. Varying the rate of arrival allows us to observe
the effect of thickening the market exogenously (see also Agarwal et al. (2018)). Each arriving
pair is sampled uniformly at random (with replacement) from the NKR data. Pairs depart from
the pool according to an independent exponential random variable unless matched prior to that
point. The mean of the exponential random variable is set to 360 (days), based on the empirical
estimate. The compatibility of two pairs is determined from real blood types, antigen and antibody
compatibility.26
We simulate greedy, patient, and batching matching policies until the arrival of the 200,000th
pair to the pool and report statistics for waiting time, matching time, and match rate by taking
averages over all or a predefined subset of pairs that belong to some collection of types. A batching
policy matches every T days the maximum number of pairs in the market, while prioritizing hard-
to-match pairs. We experimented with batching frequencies T = 7, 30, and 60 days.27
Figure 8 reports the fraction of matched pairs (left) and average waiting times (right) under
greedy, patient, and batching matching policies for different arrival rates. Patient matching results
in the highest fraction matched, and the greedy and batching policies with T = 7 result in a slightly
lower match rate (large batch sizes lead to lower match rates). Moreover, the average waiting time
under greedy matching is the smallest among all policies. Table 1 reports the fraction of matched
pairs, average waiting time, and average matching time across all pairs in the simulation. We also
note that the difference between the average matching times under batching and greedy matching
is between 10 and 40 days (depending on the arrival rate and the batch size).
An interesting empirical observation is that waiting for more pairs to arrive does not increase
the match rate (which can be seen by comparing greedy and batching policies as shown in Figure
8); however, increasing the arrival rate increases the match rate (see also Ashlagi et al. (2018)).
25Hazard rates vary slightly across pair types, but for the sake of simplicity we aggregate all pairs and used a simple
hazard rate model to estimate departures rate. For more detailed estimates see Agarwal et al. (2018).
26In practice some patients can receive a kidney from a donor with an incompatible blood type, but for simplicity
of exposition we ignore this possibility here. Similar findings hold without this assumption after adjusting the
classification of hard- and easy-to-match pairs in the data.
27We also examined weighted optimization using various weights and found no any qualitative differences. This is
consistent with Ashlagi et al. (2019), which found that prioritization is negligible when there are more hard-to-match
20
00.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.01 0.05 0.1 0.5 1 2 4
arrivals per day
Greedy Patient 7 30 60
(a) Fraction matched
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
0.01 0.05 0.1 0.5 1 2 4
arrivals per day
Greedy Patient 7 30 60
(b) Average waiting time
Figure 8: Fraction of pairs matched (left) and average waiting time in days (right) under greedy, patient, and
batching matching policies in simulations using NKR data. The x-axis represents the arrival rate measured by the
number of pairs arriving on average per day.
arrival rate match rate matching time waiting time
Greedy Patient Batch30 Greedy Patient Batch30 Greedy Patient Batch30
0.01 0.108 0.108 0.10 150.07 301.50 176.27 320.82 329.90 321.63
0.05 0.225 0.231 0.216 130.45 253.41 164.17 277.84 318.33 281.02
0.1 0.283 0.286 0.27 119.79 233.50 160.62 258.10 306.44 261.98
0.5 0.391 0.392 0.373 98.91 204.53 131.68 218.39 285.20 224.13
1 0.431 0.439 0.415 92.12 198.36 115.17 204.07 279.23 209.31
2 0.458 0.468 0.443 85.63 192.00 100.33 194.59 272.53 197.12
4 0.485 0.489 0.463 77.13 183.51 89.28 183.59 268.62 188.17
Table 1: Fraction of pairs matched, average matching time, and average waiting times in days over all pairs in
simulations using NKR data.
We also compute the average matching time and waiting time for different types of pairs.
Figure 9 reports these statistics for over-demanded pairs (left) and under-demanded pairs (right).
Under-demanded pairs are ABO incompatible with each other and consist of the following types:
O-X patient-donor pairs where X 6=O; A-AB; and B-AB.28 Over-demanded pairs are bloodtype-
compatible with each other and consist of the following types: X-O patient-donor pairs where
X 6=O; AB-A; and AB-B. Over-demanded and under-demanded pairs are roughly equivalent to
easy-to-match and hard-to-match agents in our model; over-demanded pairs can potentially match
with each other as well as other with under-demanded pairs whereas under-demanded pairs can
match only with over-demanded pairs. We note that some patients are much more sensitized
(that is, they have a variety of antibodies that will attack foreign tissue) than others even within
agents in the markets.
28An X-Y patient-donor pair contains a patient with bloodtype X and a donor with bloodtype Y.
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types, and in fact patients in over-demanded pairs are typically more sensitized than patients in
under-demanded pairs.
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Figure 9: Average matching times (MT) and waiting times (WT) in days under greedy (G) and patient (P) matching
policies in simulations using NKR data. The x-axis represents the arrival rate, which is the mean number of pairs
arriving per day.
Observe in Figure 9 that the matching and waiting times of over-demanded pairs steadily
decrease as the market becomes thicker, whereas the average matching and waiting times of under-
demanded pairs changes little. This finding is in line with the predictions from Proposition 3.
Despite the heterogeneity in the data, the theoretical predictions (of the stylized two-type model)
are aligned with the experiments when we categorize pairs as either over-demanded or under-
demanded. Moreover, the patterns hold even though patients belonging to over-demanded pairs
are, on average, more sensitized than those in under-demanded pairs.29 Figure 10 plots the fraction
matched and average waiting time of over-demanded pairs in which the patient also has a Panel
Reactive Antibody of at most 95 (that is, at least a 5% chance of being tissue-type compatible
with a random donor). So even though many of them are quite sensitized, almost all of them get
matched and their waiting time is very low as the market grows large.
Next, we run greedy and patient matching under the base case scenario (with an arrival rate
of 1 pair per period) until 700,000 pairs arrive, which again are drawn uniformly at random with
replacement from the NKR data. For each pair, we compute the average waiting time over the
copies of this pair sampled in the simulation as well as the fraction of the copies that are matched
(i.e., the empirical probability of getting matched). This gives, for each of the 1364 pairs in the
original data set, an average waiting time and an empirical probability of being matched under both
the greedy and patient matching policies. The results appear given in Figure 11. Figure 11a shows
29In fact, more than 40% of patients in over-demanded pairs have less than a 5% chance of being tissue-type
compatible with a random donor. Furthermore, about 10% of over-demanded pairs are not compatible with any
other pair within this data set, which is why the average matching and waiting times do not drop all the way to zero.
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Figure 10: Fraction of pairs matched (FM) and average waiting time (WT) for over-demanded pairs whose patients
have PRA at most 95. The x-axis represents the arrival rate measured by the number of pairs arriving on average per
day. The left y-axis represents the average waiting time in days matched and the right y-axis represents the average
fraction matched.
that for each pair in the data set, the expected waiting time under greedy matching is shorter than
the expected waiting time under patient matching (as all of the blue dots are above the 45◦ line).
This observation suggests that the waiting time distribution under greedy matching stochastically
dominates the waiting time distribution under patient matching.30 Figure 11b reports, for an
arrival rate of 1, the match rates under greedy and patient matching policies for each pair in the
data. Observe that for most pairs the empirical probabilities of matching under the greedy and
patient policies are “close” to each other.
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Figure 11: Each dot represents one of the 1364 pairs in the data. The left figure scatters the average waiting time
for each pair (averaged over its copies). The right figure scatters the empirical probability of being matched for each
pair under the greedy and patient policies. The horizontal and vertical axes correspond to the greedy and patient
policies, respectively.
30A detailed analysis of the simulation results confirms that this is indeed the case. We omit the details.
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Interestingly, Figure 11b suggests that, under greedy matching, the easy-to-match pairs are
slightly worse-off because they are matched with slightly lower probability, whereas hard-to-match
pairs are better off.
5 Final comments
This paper studies matching policies in a random dynamic market, in which some agents are
easier to match than others. We show theoretically as well as empirically that when the market is
sufficiently large, the greedy matching policy is optimal for all types of agents. This finding has
direct practical implications for kidney exchanges that may not employ greedy matching policies
out of concern that greedy matching may harm highly sensitized patients.31
Our numerical simulations further provide evidence that matching frequently does not harm the
number of transplants even for practical market sizes. While we only simulated pairwise matchings
and ignored frictions that occur in practice,32 the simulations of Ashlagi et al. (2018) account
for such frictions and show, using simulations, that among batching policies, the policy with the
shortest batching time window (essentially, the greedy policy) is optimal among a class of batching
policies.
This paper has some limitations in the context of kidney exchange. First, we focus on matching
only pairs of agents. Some kidney exchange programs, however, match pairs using chains initiated
by altruistic donors or cycles with three pairs. We note that numerous programs have very low
enrollment of nondirected (or altruistic) donors that initiate chains and, in some countries like
France, Poland, and Portugal, chains are not even feasible since altruistic donation is illegal (Biro
et al., 2017).33
Finally we discuss a few technical limitations. First, matches are chosen uniformly at random. If,
however, longer-waiting agents were to be assigned a higher priority, the waiting time and matching
time would not be distributed exponentially (while their average values remains the same). But as
the market grows large, the match rates converge to optimal under both policies, and we conjecture
that the waiting and matching times under greedy matching would stochastically dominate their
counterparts under patient and batching policies. Another limitation is that we focus on the number
of matches and not the quality of matches. Studying matching policies under heterogeneous match
values remains an intriguing challenge.
31See, e.g., Ferrari et al. (2014).
32For instance, matches do not always translate into transplants due to refusals or blood test (crossmatch) failures.
33A simple extension of our model to have directed links will in fact predict that chains are not beneficial in large
markets, which contrasts with the finding by Anderson et al. (2017). The difference stems from the fact that their
model assumes vanishing probabilities. Moreover, this prediction is likely to hold in such an extended model with a
fixed market size (but is hard to analyze).
24
References
Nikhil Agarwal, Itai Ashlagi, Eduardo Azevedo, Clayton R Featherstone, and Omer Karaduman.
Market failure in kidney exchange. Mimeo, 2018.
Mohammad Akbarpour, Shengwu. Li, and Shayan Oveis Gharan. Thickness and information in
dynamic matching markets. Mimeo, 2017.
Ross Anderson, Itai Ashlagi, David Gamarnik, and Yash Kanoria. Efficient dynamic barter ex-
change. Operations Research, 65(6):1446–1459, 2017.
I. Ashlagi, M. Burq, P. Jaillet, and V. Manshadi. On matching and thickness in heterogeneous
dynamic markets. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation,
pages 765–765. ACM, 2016.
Itai Ashlagi, Duncan. S. Gilchrist, Alvin. E. Roth, and Michael. A. Rees. Nead chains in trans-
plantation. American Journal of transplantation, 11(12):2780–2781, 2011.
Itai Ashlagi, Adam Bingaman, Maximilien Burq, Vahideh Manshadi, David Gamarnik, Cathi Mur-
phey, Alvin E Roth, Marc L Melcher, and Michael A Rees. Effect of match-run frequencies on
the number of transplants and waiting times in kidney exchange. American Journal of Trans-
plantation, 18(5):1177–1186, 2018.
Itai Ashlagi, Maximillien Burq, Patrick Jaillet, and Vahideh Manshadi. On matching and thickness
in heterogeneous dynamic markets. Operations Research, 2019. Forthcoming.
M. Baccara, S. Lee, and L. Yariv. Optimal dynamic matching. mimeo, 2015.
P. Biro, L. Burnapp, H. Bernadette, A. Hemke, R. Johnson, J. van de Klundert, and D. Manlove.
First Handbook of the COST Action CA15210: European Network for Collaboration on Kidney
Exchange Programmes (ENCKEP), 2017.
F. Bloch and D. Cantala. Dynamic allocation of objects to queuing agents: The discrete model.
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2016. Forthcoming.
John P. Dickerson, Ariel D. Procaccia, and T. Sandholm. Dynamic matching via weighted myopica
with application to kidney exchange. In AAAI, 2012.
Laura Doval. A theory of stability in dynamic matching markets. Technical report, mimeo, 2014.
25
Paolo Ferrari, Willem Weimar, Rachel J Johnson, Wai H. Lim, and Kathryn J. Tinckam. Kidney
paired donation: principles, protocols and programs. Nephrology Dialysis Transplantation, 30
(8):1276–1285, 2014.
Alan Frieze and Michal Karon´ski. Introduction to random graphs. Cambridge University Press,
2015.
M. Harchol-Balter. Performance Modeling and Design of Computer Systems: Queueing Theory in
Action. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1st edition, 2013.
Philip J Held, Frank McCormick, Akinlolu Ojo, and John P Roberts. A cost-benefit analysis of
government compensation of kidney donors. American Journal of Transplantation, 16(3):877–
885, 2016.
J. Leshno. Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Waiting Lists. mimeo, 2014.
Tracy Xiao Liu, Zhixi Wan, and Chenyu Yang. The efficiency of a dynamic decentralized two-sided
matching market. Working paper, 2018.
Afshin Nikzad, Mohammad Akbarpour, Michael A Rees, and Alvin E Roth. Financing transplants’
costs of the poor: A dynamic model of global kidney exchange. 2017.
Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun So¨nmez, and M. Utku U¨nver. Kidney exchange. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 119(2):457–488, 2004.
Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun So¨nmez, and M. Utku U¨nver. Efficient kidney exchange: Coincidence of
wants in markets with compatibility-based preferences. The American economic review, pages
828–851, 2007.
Susan. L. Saidman, Alvin. E. Roth, Tayfun So¨nmez, M. Utku U¨nver, and Francis. L. Delmonico.
Increasing the opportunity of live kidney donation by matching for two-and three-way exchanges.
Transplantation, 81(5):773–782, 2006.
M. Utku U¨nver. Dynamic Kidney Exchange. Review of Economic Studies, 77(1):372–414, 2010.
Wikipedia. Continuous time markov chain. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuous-time_
Markov_chain#Embedded_Markov_chain, 2015.
26
Appendixes
A Proofs from Section 2
Proof of Proposition 1. Note that as there are more E agents than H agents and H agents cannot
match to themselves 22+λ is an upper bound on the fraction of agents which can be matched for
any m. Note, that the size of the maximal matching (SMM) equals 22+λ if the bipartite graph with
m easy-to-match agents and m hard-to-match agents on the other side admits a perfect matching.
Becasue the probability that such a perfect matching exists converges to one as m → ∞ (see for
example Theorem 5.1 page 77 in Frieze and Karon´ski (2015)), it follows that SMM→ 22+λ .
The probability that a hard-to-match agent has no partner is given by (1 − p)m. Because
the compatibilities between hard-to-match and easy-to-match agents are drawn independently the
probability that all hard-to-match agents have at least one partner is given by
(1− (1− p)m)m(1+λ) .
This probability converges to one as m→∞. The same argument shows that the probability that
all easy-to-match agents have at least one partner converges to one.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is by contradiction; suppose such p(m) exists. The chance that
an agent has no other compatible agents is (1− p(m))m. If p(m) = O(1/m), then we have
(1− p(m))m ≤ e−mp(m) = e−O(1),
which implies that (4) cannot be satisfied. Therefore, suppose that p(m) = ω(m)m , where limm→∞ ω(m) =
∞. Next, we use this property to show that (3) cannot be satisfied.
The proof is constructive. We propose a simple algorithm that chooses a matching µ with size
|µ| such that limm→∞ |µ|m = 1. Our algorithm is a greedy algorithm, defined as follows. It orders
agents of the graph from 1 to m, and visits the agents one by one. When visiting agent i, if there
are no agents left that are compatible with agent i, then the algorithm passes agent i and moves
to agent i+ 1. Otherwise, the algorithm chooses one of the neighbors of agent i arbitrarily, namely
agent j, and adds the pair (i, j) to the matching. The algorithm then visits the next available agent
in the ordering. This process continues until the algorithm visits all agents.
We claim that the algorithm produces a matching µ which satisfies limm→∞
|µ|
m = 1. Let φ(m)
be a function that grows faster than mw(m) but slower than m. Then, during the algorithm, so long
as there are φ(m) agents left in the graph, the chance that a visited node has no compatible agents
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is
(1− w(m)/m)φ(m) ≤ e−w(m)φ(m)m = o(1).
That said, so long as there are φ(m) agents left in the graph, the agent visited by the algorithm will
be matched with a probability at least q(m) where limm→∞ q(m) = 0. By linearity of exception,
the expected number of agents that are left unmatched by the end of the algorithm is then at most
φ(m) + (m− φ(m)) · q(m). Noting that
lim
m→∞
φ(m) + (m− φ(m)) · q(m)
m
= 0
completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider a random process which is similar to the original random process
(described by M), with the following differences:
1. Matches are made greedily upon arrival of nodes, and only between an easy-to-match and a
hard-to-match node.
2. Easy-to-match nodes do not leave the pool before getting matched.
3. The probability of compatibility of an easy-to-match and a hard-to-match node is 1.
We represent the difference between the number of hard-to-match and easy-to-match nodes in
this random process with a one-dimensional MC Ml, which is defined as follows. The state space
of Ml is V (Ml) = Z. The MC is in state x when the number of hard-to-match nodes minus the
number of easy-to-match nodes is x. The transition rates from state x to its left and right neighbors
are respectively defined by
lx = m+ max{x, 0}, rx = (1 + λ)m.
It is straightforward to verify thatMl is ergodic and therefore has a unique stationary distribution
that we denote by pi. For notational simplicity, let x = Epi [max{x, 0}] and x∗ = λm.
The expected waiting time under any policy τ is at least xm(1+λ) and the expected match rate
is at most 1− xm(1+λ) . The proof of this statement is by a straightforward coupling of the sample
paths of Ml and the stochastic process corresponding to τ . We skip the tedious details.
The proposition is proved in two steps. The first step shows that x ≤ x∗+o(x∗), and the second
step shows that x ≥ x∗ − o(x∗). This would prove the claim.
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Proof of Step i. We start by writing the balance equations, according to which
pii+1
pii
=
ri+1
li
. (5)
Suppose i = x∗ + y, for some y > 0. Then,
pii+1
pii
=
(1 + λ)m
x∗ + y +m
=
(1 + λ)m
x∗ + y +m
= 1− y
x∗ + y +m
.
Let n = x∗ +m. When y > 2n1/2, then the above equation implies that
pii+1
pii
≤ 1− n1/2 = 1− n1/2,
pii
pix∗
≤ 1− n1/2.
The above equations imply that for any i with i− x∗ > 2n1/2 we have
pii
pix∗
≤
(
1− n−1/2
)i−x∗−2n1/2
≤ e−n−1/2·(i−x∗−2n1/2)
= e
2− i−x∗√
n (6)
Now, we can establish that x ≤ x∗ +O(√n). This is done by applying (6) as follows
x¯ = Ex∼pi [max{x, 0}] ≤ x∗ +
∞∑
i=0
pix∗+i
√
n · (i+ 1)
√
n
≤ x∗ +
∞∑
i=0
e
2−x∗+i
√
n−x∗√
n · (i+ 1)√n (7)
= x∗ +
√
n
∞∑
i=0
e2−i · (i+ 1) = x∗ +O(√n) = x∗ + o(x∗), (8)
where (7) holds by (6), and (8) holds because x∗ > nδ for a δ > 1/2.
Proof of Step ii. In this step we prove that x¯ ≥ x∗− o(x∗). The proof is similar to the previous
step. Now, suppose i = x∗ − y, for some y > 0. Equation (5) then implies
pii
pii+1
=
x∗ − y + λ
n
=
n− y
n
= 1− y
n
. (9)
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The above bound, followed by a calculation similar to how we derived (6) implies
pii
pix∗
≤ e2−x
∗−i√
n (10)
for all i < x∗.
Also, observe that
pii
pii+1
=
1
1 + λ
(11)
holds for all i < 0. Define pi<0 =
∑
i<0 pii. Equations (10) and (11) imply that
pi<0 ≤ e2−
x∗√
n = o(1). (12)
Next, we use (10) and (12) to provide a lower bound for x¯:
x¯ = Ex∼pi [max{x, 0}] ≥ (1− pi<0) · x∗ −
x∗/
√
n∑
i=0
pix∗−i√n · (i+ 1)
√
n
≥ (1− pi<0) · x∗ −
√
n
x∗/
√
n∑
i=0
pix∗ · e2−i · (i+ 1) (13)
= (1− pi<0) · x∗ −O(
√
n) = x∗ − o(x∗) (14)
where (13) holds by (10) and (14) holds by (12).
B Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 is a direct consequence of Propositions 3 and 4. Proposition 4 was proved in Section A.
To prove the theorem, we prove the rest of the propositions. Before starting the proofs, we state
some preliminaries in Section C. The greedy, patient, and batching policies are then analyzed in
Sections D, E, and F, respectively.
Proof of Proposition 3. The first part of this proposition is a direct consequence of Proposition 5.
The second part of the proposition is proved in Section F. The third part of the proposition is a
direct consequence of Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 5. The claim on the match rate under greedy matching is proved in Lemma 5.
The claim on waiting time is proved in Lemma 6 and Lemma 7. These lemmas are stated and
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proved in Section D.
Proof of Proposition 6. The claim on the match rate under patient matching is proved in Lemma 9.
The claim on the waiting time is proved in Lemma 10 and Lemma 11. These lemmas are stated
and proved in Section E.
C Preliminaries
We use the terms E pool and H pool to denote the pools containing E agents and H agents, re-
spectively. The terms E arrival and H arrival respectively refer to the arrival of an E agent and
the arrival of an H agent. The term departure clock refers to the exponential random variable that
determines the exogenous time that an agent becomes critical if she does not get matched prior
to that time. When the departure clock ticks, the agent leaves the pool if she has not left with
a match already. We use the term departure to refer to the event of an agent leaving the pool,
either because of being matched to another agent or because her departure clock ticks. Similarly,
the terms E departure and H departure refer to the departure of an E agent and the departure of
an H agent.
Each of the policies, greedy or patient, defines a continuous-time stochastic process whose state
space is
{(x, y) : 0 ≤ x+ y ≤ C, x, y ∈ Z},
where (x, y) denotes a state with x hard-to-match and y easy-to-match agents. These stochastic
processes could be modeled as a Markov chain in the natural way. (The Markov chains would have
the same state space as the above) We call the corresponding Markov chains the greedy Markov
chain, and the patient Markov chain, respectively.
Under either of these policies, an agent might have to search for a compatible match. This hap-
pens in greedy matching upon the arrival of agents, and in patient matching upon their departure.
In either of the policies, we suppose that an agent searches for a compatible match in the following
way: she orders all the agents in the H pool in a random order,34 and gets matched to the first
agent compatible with her, in that order. If no compatible agent is found, then the agent orders
all the agents in the E pool in a random order and gets matched to the first compatible agent in
that ordering. It also helps the analysis to define the notion of offer. When a searching agent a
checks her compatibility with another agent b, if a and b are compatible, then we say that a makes
34That is, she draws a permutation over all the H agents, uniformly at random.
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an offer to b. By the definition of our policies, offers are always accepted. In our analysis, however,
we sometimes consider scenarios in which an agent does not accept any offers. We always assume
all offers are accepted unless we explicitly mention otherwise.
Suppose f, g : R+ → R+. We use the notation g = o(f) when limn→∞ g(n)f(n) = 0 and g = O(f)
when limn→∞
g(n)
f(n) <∞.
We say an event E holds with high probability (whp) when limm→∞ P
[
E¯
]
= 0. For notational
simplicity, we also write this as P
[
E¯
]
= o(1). We say an event E holds with low probability (wlp)
when E¯ holds whp. We say an event E holds with very high probability (wvhp) when P
[
E¯
] ≤ e−mα ,
for some constant α > 0. We say an event E holds with very low probability (wvlp) when E¯ holds
wvhp.
C.1 Markov chains
In case of existence, we denote the unique stationary distribution of a Markov chain N by pi(N ).
Sometimes we slightly abuse the notation and use pi to denote the stationary distribution of a
Markov chain that is clearly known in the context.
Proposition 7. Anderson et al. (2017) Suppose that Xt is positive recurrent and that there exists
α, β, γ > 0, a set B ⊂ X , and functions U : X → R+ and f : X → R+ such that for x ∈ X\B,
Ex [U(X1)− U(X0)] ≤ −γf(x), (15)
and for x ∈ B,
f(x) ≤ α, (16)
Ex [U(X1)− U(X0)] ≤ β. (17)
Then
E [f(X∞)] ≤ α+ β
γ
. (18)
Embedded Markov Chain
To apply Proposition 7, we need to work with a discrete-time MC. The Markov chains that we have
referred to, however, so far have been continuous-time Markov chains. Rather than working with
the continuous time Markov chain N , we typically work with a well-known discrete-time Markov
chain that is called the embedded Markov chain for N , which we denote by N̂ . For completeness,
we state the definition of N̂ below. Let N be a continuous-time Markov chain with transition rate
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ni,j from state i to state j, for any i 6= j. Let N be the transition rate matrix for N , i.e., Ni,j = ni,j
for i 6= j, and the entries on the diagonal of N are set so each row in N sums to 0.
Definition 5. The embedded Markov chain of N , denoted by N̂ , is a discrete-time Markov chain
with V (N̂ ) = V (N ). The transition probability from state i to state j in N̂ is denoted by n̂i,j and
is defined by
n̂i,j =

ni,j∑
k 6=i ni,k
if i 6= j
0 if i = j.
Given that a finite-state Markov chain is ergodic, it is straightforward to show that its em-
bedded Markov chain has a unique stationary distribution that we denote by pi Wikipedia (2015).
Intuitively, N̂ is a discrete-time Markov chain that “behaves” similar to N . We formalize the
notion of similarity that we use in our analysis below.
Definition 6. Let N = 〈Nm〉m≥0 and N ′ = 〈N ′m〉m≥0 represent two infinite sequences of Markov
chains where V (Nm) = V (N ′m) and |V (Nm)| < |V (Nm+1)| for all m ≥ 0. Suppose pim, pi′m respec-
tively denote the unique stationary distributions for Nm,N ′m. We say N approximates N ′, and
denote it by N ∼∼ N ′, if there exist constants m0 > 0 and θ, θ¯ > 0 such that for all m > m0 and all
x ∈ V (Nm) we have
θ · pi′m(x) ≤ pim(x) ≤ θ¯ · pi′m(x).
The next lemma shows that, under certain conditions, the expected values of a function are not
“too far” from each other, where the expectations are taken over the stationary distribution of a
Markov chain and the stationary distribution of its embedded Markov chain. We have not tried to
state the most general version of this lemma, by any means; the following version comes in handy
in the analysis.
Lemma 1. Let N = 〈Nm〉m≥0 and N ′ = 〈N ′m〉m≥0 be two infinite sequences of Markov chains with
state spaces defined on Z such that N ∼∼ N ′. Also, let f : Z→ R+. Then, if 35
Ex∼pi(Nm) [f(x)] ≤ o(m),
we would also have
Ex∼pi(N ′m) [f(x)] ≤ o(m).
Proof. Let pi, pi′ respectively denote pi(Nm), pi(N ′m), and θ, θ¯ be the coefficients defined in Definition
35Recall that o(m) denotes a term that grows with a rate slower than m.
33
6. Then,
o(m) ≥ Ex∼pi [f(x)]
=
∑
x
pi(x)f(x)
≥
∑
x
θpi′(x)f(x) = θ · Ex∼pi′ [f(x)] ,
which implies Ex∼pi′ [f(x)] ≤ o(m).
D Analysis of Greedy Matching
In this section, we first analyze the stochastic process corresponding to the greedy policy. The main
technical results established by this analysis are stated in Subsection D.3. Using these results we
will be able to prove the results on the match rate and waiting time for greedy matching (mentioned
in Subsection 3.2). We establish the result on the match rate in Subsection D.7 and the waiting
time result in Subsection D.8.
D.1 A Simplifying Assumption
Before we start the analysis, we make an additional assumption for the sake of technical simplicity.
As we will explain, our theorems quantitatively remain the same with or without this assumption.
The Finite Capacity Assumption. We suppose that the exchange program has capacity C =
κ ·m, where κ > 0 is a fixed constant that could be chosen arbitrary large. That is, if an arriving
agent does not find a match immediately upon arrival and the total number of agents currently in
the system is at least κ ·m, then that agent will not be added to the system.
For example, by letting C = 100m, we restrict the maximum possible number of agents at each
moment in the system to be bounded by the expected number of pairs that arrive in the next 100
time units.36 For practical purposes, this is a very reasonable assumption: through the analysis,
we can see that the chance of having 100m agents in the system is a low-probability event; more
precisely, the stationary probability of this event is bounded by 2−m(96−2λ)). This fact also gives
an intuitive explanation of why our quantitative results do not rely on this assumption. When this
assumption is dismissed, the proof would follow similarly while bearing some additional notation.
To avoid tedious notation, we present the analysis of greedy matching under this assumption.
36Since 1 to 5 years is a reasonable estimate for each time unit in our model, the capacity in this case would be
about the number of arriving agents in the next 100 to 500 years.
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D.2 Modeling the dynamics
We use a two-dimensional Markov chain, which we denote by M, to model the dynamics of the
pool size. First we set up some notation before proceeding to the description. For brevity, we use
the abbreviation MC for Markov chain. For MC M, let V (M) denote the state space of M. We
represent each state by a pair (x, y) where x, y respectively denote the number of H agents and the
number of E agents. In other words, we have
V (M) = {(x, y) : 0 ≤ x+ y ≤ C, x, y ∈ Z},
where we recall that the term C is the capacity parameter defined in the Finite Capacity Assump-
tion.
The definition ofM would be completed by defining the transition rates. A transition can only
happen from a state (x, y) to its (at most) four neighbors, which are
{(x′, y′) ∈ V (M) : |x− x′|+ |y − y′| = 1}.
See Figure 12 for a visual description of the neighbors. To simplify the definition of transition rates
from a node to its neighbors, we define the following notations: Let Mx = (1−p)x and Ny = (1−q)y.
For each node (x, y), we denote the transition rates from this node to its four neighbors on the top,
right, bottom, and left of it by ux,y, rx,y, dx,y, lx,y. These rates are defined as follows:
• If x + y < C, ux,y = mMxNy is the transition rate from the node (x, y) to node (x, y + 1),
otherwise ux,y = 0.
• If x+ y < C, rx,y = m(1 + λ)Ny is the transition rate from the node (x, y) to node (x+ 1, y),
otherwise rx,y = 0.
• If y > 0, then dx,y = mMx(1 − Ny) + m(1 + λ)(1 − Ny) + y is the transition rate from the
node (x, y) to node (x, y − 1), otherwise di,j = 0.
• If x > 0, then lx,y = m(1 − Mx) + x is the transition rate from the node (x, y) to node
(x− 1, y), otherwise lx,y = 0.
Given the above transition rates forM, it is straightforward to verify that it models our stochastic
process.
Proposition 8. M is ergodic and has a unique stationary distribution, pi.
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x, yx− 1, y x+ 1, y
x, y + 1
x, y − 1
m(1−Mx) + x
m(1 + λ)Ny
mMxNy
mMx(1−Ny) +m(1 + λ)(1−Ny) + y
Figure 12: An illustration of the transitions from node (x, y) Markov chain.
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Proof. It is enough to show that M is ergodic, i.e., that it is irreducible and positive recurrent.
Irreducibility is trivial: there is only one communication class. To prove that M is positive recur-
rent, it is enough to note that it has a finite state space; this implies that M is ergodic and has a
unique stationary distribution.
We remark that the existence of the stationary distribution does not rely on the Finite Capacity
Assumption (nor do the statements of our theorems, as mentioned earlier).
Definition 7. Let pi denote the stationary distribution of M and pi(i, j) denote the probability
assigned to state (i, j) in pi. We define pi(i, j) = 0 when i + j > C. Let pi(i) =
∑∞
j=0 pi(i, j) and
pij =
∑∞
i=0 pi(i, j).
D.3 The main analytical results for greedy matching
The next two theorems are the core technical results for the analysis of greedy matching. They will
be used for proving our results on the match rate and the waiting time distribution under greedy
matching (Subsections D.7 and D.8).
Theorem 2. Epi [x] = λm+O(
√
m) and Epi [y] = O(1).
Theorem 3. There exists constants θX, θY > 0 such that for any x, y ≥ 0, we have
pi(x) ≤ e−θX·
|x−x∗|√
m ,
pi(y) ≤ e−θY·y,
where x∗ = λm.
Computing Epi [y] and showing that y is concentrated around its mean is the relatively easier
part of Theorems 2 and 3; this is done in Subsection D.6. The main idea to prove the other
parts (i.e., computing Epi [x] and showing that x is concentrated around its mean) is defining
two other Markov processes that are coupled with M, namely Ml,Mu. These two processes are
defined such that the number of unmatched hard-to-match agents in M stochastically dominates
the number of unmatched hard-to-match agents in Ml and is stochastically dominated by the
number of unmatched hard-to-match agents in Mu.
In Sections D.5 and D.4, we will show that
Epil [x] = λm+O(
√
m), (19)
Epiu [x] = λm+O(
√
m), (20)
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where pil, piu respectively denote the (unique) stationary distributions of Ml,Mu. This implies
that Epi [x] = λm + O(
√
m). To prove the concentration result, we will show that for the random
processes Ml,Mu, there exist constants θl, θu > 0 such that
pil(x) ≤ e−θl · |x− x
∗|√
m
, (21)
piu(x) ≤ e−θu · |x− x
∗|√
m
. (22)
This is done in Sections D.5 and D.4. Then, we use the fact that the PMF of x inM stochastically
dominates the PMF of x inMl and is stochastically dominated by the PMF of x inMu. This fact,
together with (21) and (22), implies that there exists a constant θX > 0 such that
pi(x) ≤ e−θX·
|x−x∗|√
m .
We prove (20) and (22) in Subsection D.4, and (19) and (21) in Subsection D.5. We introduced
the required notions and tools for the analysis in Appendix C.
D.4 Definition of Mu
Consider a random process which is similar to the original random process (described byM), with
the following differences:
1. Matches are made only between hard-to-match nodes and easy-to-match nodes.
2. Matches are made greedily only upon arrival of easy-to-match nodes.
3. Easy-to-match nodes do not stay in the pool: they leave right after their arrival, if they are
not matched with a hard-to-match node.
We represent the number of hard-to-match nodes in this random process with a one-dimensional
MC Mu, which is defined as follows. The state space of Mu is defined as V (Mu) = {0, 1, 2, . . .}.
The MC is in state x when the number of hard-to-match agents in the pool is x. The transition
rates from state x to its left and right neighbors are respectively defined by lx = m(1 − Nx) + x
and rx = m(1 + λ). It is straightforward to verify that Mu is ergodic and therefore has a unique
stationary distribution that we denote by piu.
Lemma 2. Epiu [|x− x∗|] = O(
√
m).
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Proof. The proof is by Proposition 7. First, we define the functions f, U to be:
f(x) = |x− x∗|,
U(x) = (x− x∗)2.
Also, we define B = {x : |x− x∗| < √m}. We apply Proposition 7 to the embedded Markov chain
corresponding to Mu, which we denote by M̂u. This will imply that
Epiu [|x− x∗|] = O(
√
m).
If this is proved, the lemma is then concluded by Lemma 1; note that Lemma 1 is applicable since,
by Claim 1, we have Mu ∼∼ M̂u.
Next, we bound Epiu [∆U(x)], by considering two cases: x > x∗ and x < x∗. For notational
simplicity, we will drop the index piu from the expectation in the rest of this proof. Also, let
Sx = lx + rx. When x > x
∗, we have
E [∆U(x)] = (m(1 + λ)−m(1−Mx)− x) · 2(x− x
∗)
Sx
+ 2/Sx
≤ −Ω((x− x∗)/√m),
where the last inequality holds, since x− x∗ > √m.
Now, suppose x < x∗. Then
E [∆U(x)] = (m(1−Mx) + x−m(1 + λ)) · 2(x
∗ − x)
Sx
+ 2/Sx
≤ −Ω((x− x∗)/√m).
Therefore, we can set γ = Ω(1/
√
m). Also, it is straightforward to verify that α = O(
√
m) and
β = O(1), by the definition of B. This implies that Epiu [f(x)] = O(
√
m), which proves the promised
claim.
Claim 1. Let M̂u denote the embedded Markov chain of Mu. Then, Mu ∼∼ M̂u.
Proof. Since Mu is ergodic, then M̂u has a unique stationary distribution. Let piu, piu denote the
stationary distributions of Mu and M̂u. Also, suppose M denotes the transition rate matrix of
Mu. Then, piu can be written in terms of piu as follows Wikipedia (2015):
piu = − piu(diag(M))
−1
‖piu(diag(M))−1‖1
.
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Thus, for any state x, we can write
piu(x) = piu(x) · −1/Mx,x‖piu(diag(M))−1‖1
.
Given this equation, the lemma would be proved if there exist constants θ, θ¯ > 0 such that
θ <
−1/Mx,x
‖piu(diag(M))−1‖1
< θ¯. (23)
To see why (23) holds, first note that for any x, we have −Mx,x = Θ(m), by the Finite Capacity
Assumption. From this, we can imply that
∥∥piu(diag(M))−1∥∥1 = Θ(m), since the left-hand-side is a
convex combination of the diagonal entries. These two facts together imply (23), which concludes
the lemma.
D.5 Definition of Ml
Consider a random process which is similar to the original random process (described byM), with
the following differences:
1. Matches are made greedily upon arrival of nodes, and only between an easy-to-match and a
hard-to-match node.
2. Easy-to-match nodes do not leave the pool before getting matched.
3. The probability of compatibility of an easy-to-match and a hard-to-match node is 1.
We represent the difference between the number of hard-to-match and easy-to-match nodes in
this random process with a one-dimensional MC Ml, which is defined as follows. The state space
of Ml is V (Ml) = Z. The MC is in state x when the number of hard-to-match nodes minus the
number of easy-to-match nodes is x. The transition rates from state x to its left and right neighbors
are respectively defined by
lx = m+ max{x, 0}, rx = (1 + λ)m.
It is straightforward to verify thatMl is ergodic and therefore has a unique stationary distribution
that we denote by piu.
Lemma 3. Epil [|x− x∗|] = O(
√
m).
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Proof. The proof is by Proposition 7. First, we define the functions f, U to be:
f(x) = |x− x∗|,
U(x) = (x− x∗)2.
Also, we define B = {x : |x− x∗| < √m}. We apply Proposition 7 to the embedded Markov chain
corresponding to Ml, which we denote by M̂l. This would imply that
Epil [|x− x∗|] = O(
√
m).
If this is proved, the lemma is then concluded by Lemma 1; note that Lemma 1 is applicable since,
by Claim 2, we have Mu ∼∼ M̂u.
Next, we bound Epil [∆U(x)], by considering two cases: x > x
∗, and x < x∗. For notational
simplicity, we will drop the index pil from the expectation in the rest of this proof. Also, let
Sx = lx + rx. When x > x
∗, we have
E [∆U(x)] = (m(1 + λ)−m− x) · 2(x− x
∗)
Sx
+ 2/Sx
≤ −Ω((x− x∗)/√m),
where the last inequality holds since x− x∗ > √m.
Next, we consider the second case, x < x∗. See that
E [∆U(x)] = (m+ max{x, 0} −m(1 + λ)) · 2(x
∗ − x)
Sx
+ 2/Sx
≤ −Ω((x∗ − x)/√m).
Therefore, we can set γ = Ω(1/
√
m). Also, it is straightforward to verify that α = O(
√
m) and
β = O(1), by the definition of B. This implies that Epil [f(x)] = O(
√
m), which proves the claim.
Claim 2. Let M̂l denote the embedded Markov chain of Ml. Then, Ml ∼∼ M̂l.
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of Claim 1.
D.6 Analysis of the Markov chain on the vertical axis
Lemma 4. Let pi denote the stationary distribution of M. Then, Epi [y] = O(1). Moreover, y is
concentrated around its mean, in the following sense: there exists θY > 0 such that for any y ≥ 0,
we have pi(y) ≤ e−θY·y.
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Proof. It is enough to show that there exist constants y > 0 and θ > 1 such that for any y ≥ y we
have pi(y)/pi(y + 1) > θ.
Let
Up(y) = {ux,y : x ≥ 0}, Down(y) = {dx,y : x ≥ 0}.
Also, let y be the smallest positive integer for which Ny < 1/3. Now, see that
min{d : d ∈ Down(y + 1)}
max{u : u ∈ Up(y)} ≥
m(1 + λ)(2/3)
m/3
> 2.
Therefore, by the balance equations, we can set θ = 2.
D.7 Match rate under greedy matching
Lemma 5. Under greedy matching, the match rate of hard-to-match agents is 11+λ − O( 1(1+λ)√m)
and the match rate of easy-to-match agents is 1− o(1).
Proof. First, we define some notation. Let mE = m and mH = (1 + λ)m. We use E
G
t , H
G
t
respectively to denote the number of E, H agents under the greedy policy at time t.
For any type Θ ∈ {E,H}, let G(Θ) denote the match rate of Θ under greedy matching. The
death rate (the rate of agents who depart the market unmatched) would then be 1 − G(Θ). A
straightforward calculation shows that
1− G(Θ) = Θ
G
mΘ
.
This is a consequence of the fact that the departure rate for all agents is equal to 1. An application
of linearity of expectation and the ergodic theorem imply the above equality. We then can use
Theorem 2 to write
1− G(E) = E
G
m
= O(1/m)
and
1− G(H) = H
G
(1 + λ)m
=
λm+O(
√
m)
(1 + λ)m
=
λ
1 + λ
+O(1/
√
m).
This proves the claim for greedy matching.
D.8 Distribution of waiting time under greedy matching
We show that the waiting time for matching matched hard-to-match agents has an exponential
distribution with rate 1 + 1/λ. This result is derived from the assumption that the ties between
hard-to-match agents are broken randomly. As a consequence, we will be able to compute the
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expected waiting time of hard-to-match agents, conditioned on being matched or unconditionally.
(Recall that the former is called the “matching time” and the latter the “waiting time”.)
Lemma 6. Under the greedy policy, as m approaches infinity, the waiting time and matching time
of an E agent converge in distribution to the degenerate distribution at 0.
Proof. First, we prove the result for waiting time. Fix an E agent, e, and let we denote the waiting
time for e. For any fixed constant t > 0, we will show that limm→∞ P [t > we] = 0. This will prove
the claim. First, see that
E [we] =
1
m
· E(x,y)∼pi [x] =
1
m
·O(1)
where the second equality holds because of Theorem 2. Therefore, by Markov inequality,
P [we > t] < O(t/m)
holds, which means limm→∞ P [t > we] = 0.
Now, we prove the result on the matching time (i.e., the waiting time of matched agents). Let
Me denote the event in which e leaves the pool with a match. Our goal is to show that, for any
fixed constant t > 0,
lim
m→∞P [t > we|Me] = 0.
See that
P [we = 0|Me] = P [we = 0]P [Me] = 1− o(1),
where the second equality holds because of Theorem 3. Therefore,
P [we > 0|Me] = o(1),
which implies that
P [we > t|Me] = o(1).
This proves the claim.
Lemma 7. As m approaches infinity, the waiting time and matching time of hard-to-match agents
converge in distribution to Exp(1 + 1λ).
We sketch the proof below. The formal proof is presented after the proof sketch.
Proof sketch. Here we give a proof sketch. We define a new process, namely P, in which there are
no easy-to-match agents. Rather, an exponential clock is attached to each hard-to-match agent
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which ticks at rate 1/λ. We suppose the agent is matched if the clock ticks before the agent departs.
It is not hard to show that the matching time of agents in P converges to the matching time of
hard-to-match agents in the original process in distribution, as m approaches infinity.
Now, we compute the distribution for the waiting time of an agent in P. Consider an agent
p and suppose it has entered the pool at time t0. Note that p is matched iff it is matched before
her departure clock ticks. Let t1, t2 be random variables such that t1 ∼ exp(1/λ), t2 ∼ exp(1);
these random variables are interpreted as follows. The agent departs at time t0 + t2 if she has not
received any matches by then (i.e., her clock has not ticked). The time t0 + t1 is the first time when
the agent’s offer clock ticks, i.e., the first time when the agent receives an offer. So, the agent is
matched if and only if t1 < t2. Alternatively, we can say the agent is matched iff t1 = tmin where
tmin = min{t1, t2}.
First, see that tmin represents the waiting time of the agent. Therefore, the waiting time of the
agent has distribution Exp(1 + 1/λ).
Next, we compute the distribution of the matching time. Fix a constant z > 0. The probability
that an agent is matched before time z conditioned on being matched is
P
[
t1 < z
∣∣t1 = tmin] = P [tmin < z∧ t1 = tmin]P [t1 = tmin]
=
P [tmin < z] · P [t1 = tmin]
P [t1 = tmin]
= P [tmin < z] .
Since the above equality holds for any z, then the waiting time for an agent conditioned on being
matched has the same distribution as the distribution of tmin, which is Exp(1 + 1/λ).
Proof of Lemma 7. First, we show that the waiting time of an H agent converges in distribution
to Exp(1 + 1/λ). To this end, fix an H agent, h, upon her arrival at time t0. Let Q denote the
stochastic process under greedy matching starting from t0 and ending when h leaves the system.
We couple another process with Q, namely Q′. We define this coupling below. Roughly speaking,
Q′ is the same as the greedy matching process, with the exception that the arrival of h is “ignored”
in the sense that h does not interfere with the evolution of Q′.
• Q′ runs from time t0 to t0 + logm. Furthermore, the departure clock of h is set to tick at
time t0 + logm in Q′.
• If h finds a compatible match upon her arrival (at time t0) in Q, then we stop both Q,Q′.
Otherwise, we let Q evolve according to the greedy process. By definition, Q′ has a sample
path identical to Q, until one of the following disjoint events happens:
Event (i) h receives an offer in Q before time t0 + logm. In this case, we stop Q. In Q′,
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h rejects the received offer as well as all offers she will receive in the future. Any
E agent who gets rejected by h will make an offer to the next compatible agent
in his (random) list. Q′ will continue evolving according to the greedy process,
with the exception of agent h, who does not interfere with the process.
Event (ii) The departure clock of h ticks in Q before time t0 + logm and h departs without
being matched. In this case, we stop Q but continue to run Q′. Q′ will continue
evolving according to the greedy process, with the exception of agent h, who does
not interfere with the process (i.e., agent h rejects all the offers she receives, in
the sense clarified above).
• We stop Q′ when it reaches time t0 + logm.
For notational simplicity, we suppose t0 = 0 without loss of generality. Let Eh(t) denote the
event in which h leaves the pool in Q before time t (either matched or unmatched). Also, let E′h(t)
denote the event in which h receives at least one offer in Q′ before time t. For any constant t > 0,
we have
lim
m→∞P
[
Eh(t)
]
= e−t · lim
m→∞P
[
E′h(t)
]
. (24)
Therefore, if we show that limm→∞ P
[
E′h(t)
]
= e−t/λ, we can use (25) to imply that
lim
m→∞P
[
Eh(t)
]
= e−t·(1+1/λ),
which proves the claim on the distribution of waiting time. To complete the proof, the following
claim must be proved.
Claim 3. For any constant t > 0,
lim
m→∞P
[
E′h(t)
]
= e−t/λ. (25)
Proof. Our proof approach is as follows. First, we observe that the process Q′ can be run from
time t0 = 0 to logm as follows: sample a state (x, y) ∼ pi. Then, let the stochastic system start
from (x, y) and evolve for logm units of time, under the greedy policy. By the PASTA property,37
the sample paths generated by this process are identical to the sample paths of Q′ (note that the
arrival of h is “ignored” in Q′, in the sense that h does not affect the evolution of Q′).
37PASTA, or Poisson Arrivals See Time Averages, is a well-known property in the queueing literature; e.g., see
Harchol-Balter (2013).
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By the above argument, we sample the state (x, y) ∼ pi at time t0 = 0, and let the process run
until time logm. We also consider an “imaginary agent” h, which exists in the H pool, but rejects
all of the proposals that are made to her. Our goal is to show that the probability that h receives
no proposals in the period [0, t], which we know by P
[
E′h(t)
]
, approaches e−t/λ as m approaches
infinity.
Let Ht denote the history of the process until time t. (Note that the history does not include
the offers made to h, this agent does not change the evolution of the process.) Let the random
variable nt denote the number of E agents who arrive to the pool in the time interval [0, t]. Also,
let a1, . . . , ant denote the arrival times of these agents. Define x1, . . . , xnt to be the number of H
agents in the pool at times a1, . . . , ant , respectively. Now, see that
P
[
E′h(t)
∣∣Ht] ≥ Πnti=1(1− 1xi ), (26)
P
[
E′h(t)
∣∣Ht] ≤ Πnti=1(1− 1− (1− p)xixi ), (27)
where (26) and (27) hold because the chance that a match happens at time ai is at most 1 and at
least 1− (1− p)xi .
In the rest of the proof, we will use probabilistic bounds to show that in almost all histories Ht,
nt is close to tm and x
∗ is close to λm, where x∗ = min{x1, . . . , xnt}. This will let us simplify (26)
and (27). The simplified forms will expose that in almost all histories Ht, P
[
E′h(t)
]
approaches
e−t/λ as m approaches infinity.
Define event G1 as
G1 : λm−
√
m log2m ≤ x∗ ≤ λm+√m log2m.
We will show that G¯1 happens wlp. To do this, we use the fact that the size of the H pool after
the arrival of any H agent is close to λm (in the sense of Theorem 3). Formally, we use the PASTA
property together with Theorem 3 and write a union bound over all arrivals of E agents in the
interval [0, t]. This implies that G¯1 happens wlp. More precisely, this implies that
P
[
G¯1
] ≤ e−O(log2m). (28)
Define event G2 as
G2 : tm−
√
tm logm ≤ nt ≤ tm+
√
tm logm.
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By Chebyshev’s inequality,
P
[
G¯2
] ≤ log−2m. (29)
Note that the above inequality holds because Poisson distribution has equal mean and variance; in
this case, the random variable nt has mean and variance tm.
Now, recall (26) and (27), and that our goal is to show that in almost all histories Ht, nt is
close to tm and x∗ is close to λm. Inequalities (28) and (29) show just this. More formally, they
imply that in almost all histories Ht but a fraction O(1/ log2m) of them, the events G1, G2 hold.
Therefore, we can use (26) and (27) to write
P
[
E′h(t)
]
≥ (1−O(1/ log2m)) · e− tmλm ,
P
[
E′h(t)
]
≤ e− tmλm ·(1−o(1)).
The above equations imply that
lim
m→∞P
[
E′h(t)
]
= e−t/λ.
The proof is complete.
To complete the proof of the lemma, it remains to show that the waiting time of matched H
agents converges in distribution to Exp(1 + 1λ). We follow the same idea used in the proof sketch.
Again, we fix an H agent, h, who arrives at time t0 = 0. Define the (coupled) processes Q,Q′ as
before. Let t1 be a random variable that denotes the first time at which h receives an offer in Q′.
If h does not receive an offer in Q′, let t1 = logm. Also, let t2 be an (independent) exponential
random variable with rate 1. This variable denotes the time at which the departure clock of h ticks
in Q.
Define the random variable tmin = min{t1, t2}. For any constant z > 0, observe that
P
[
t1 < z
∣∣h receives an offer in Q] =
P
[
t1 < z
∣∣h receives an offer in Q before time logm]+
P
[
t1 < z
∣∣h receives an offer in Q after time logm] .
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Therefore, we can write
lim
m→∞P
[
t1 < z
∣∣h receives an offer in Q]
= lim
m→∞P
[
t1 < z
∣∣h receives an offer in Q before time logm]
= lim
m→∞P
[
t1 < z
∣∣t1 = tmin] . (30)
Next, observe that
lim
m→∞P
[
t1 < z
∣∣t1 = tmin] = lim
m→∞
P [tmin < z
∧
t1 = tmin]
P [t1 = tmin]
.
Now, recall from the first part of the proof that t1 converges in distribution to Exp(1/λ). (This is
essentially due to Claim 3). Now, note that since t2 converges in distribution to Exp(1/λ), then tmin
converges in distribution to Exp(1 + 1/λ). Therefore, since t1, t2 are independent random variables
and tmin = min{t1, t2}, we can simplify the above equation further as follows.
lim
m→∞P
[
t1 < z
∣∣t1 = tmin] = lim
m→∞
P [tmin < z
∧
t1 = tmin]
P [t1 = tmin]
= lim
m→∞
P [tmin < z] · P [t1 = tmin]
P [t1 = tmin]
= lim
m→∞P [tmin < z] = e
−z(1+1/λ).
The above equation together with (30) implies that
lim
m→∞P
[
t1 < z
∣∣h receives an offer in Q] = e−z(1+1/λ). (31)
This finishes the proof.
Corollary 1 (of Lemma 7). The conditional expected waiting time for a hard-to-match agent
conditioned on not being matched is 1 + λ− 11+λ .
Proof. Let w be a random variable denoting the waiting time of an agent p and let M be the event
in which agent p is matched. Also, let M¯ be the complement of M .
E [w] = P [M ] · E [w∣∣M]+ P [M¯] · E [w∣∣M¯] . (32)
Note that the left-hand-side is equal to λ. Also, see that
E
[
w
∣∣M] = λ
1 + λ
,
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which holds by Lemma 7. Note that P [M ] = 11+λ . Therefore, plugging the above equation into
(32) implies that
E
[
w
∣∣M¯] = 1 + λ− 1
1 + λ
.
E Analysis of Patient Matching
After introducing some notation, we analyze the stochastic process corresponding to the patient
policy. First, we present our core technical result, Theorem 4, and prove it in Subsection E.1. After
that, we prove our results about the match rate and the distribution of waiting time under patient
matching in Subsections E.2 and E.3.
For the analysis in this section, we use a two-dimensional MC,M, to model the dynamics. Let
V (M) denote the state space ofM. We represent each state by a pair (x, y) where x, y respectively
denote the number of H-agents and E-agents. In other words, we have
V (M) = {(x, y) : x, y ≥ 0, x, y ∈ Z}.
The definition of M would be completed by defining the transition rates. Similar to the MC for
the greedy policy, a transition can only happen from a state (x, y) to its (at most) four neighbors,
which are
{(x′, y′) ∈ V (M) : |x− x′|+ |y − y′| = 1}.
We do not define these transition rates explicitly here, since they are defined implicitly by the
policy. Define (x∗, y∗) = E(x,y)∈pi [(x, y)].
The following technical result forms the basis of our analysis and is proved in Subsection E.1.
Theorem 4. There exists a constant σY > 0 such that for any y ≥ 0, we have
pi(y) ≤ e−σY·y.
The above result is essentially a concentration result for the E pool. The following concentration
result holds for the H pool, which will not be used in our analysis. We state it for the sake of
completeness.
Theorem. There exists a constant σX > 0 such that for any x ≥ 0, we have
pi(x) ≤ e−σX·
|x−x∗|√
m .
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Furthermore, |x∗ − (1 + λ)m| = o(m).
Below we state a weaker version of the above theorem, which will be used in the analysis. The
proof is presented in Subsection E.1.
Lemma 8. There exists a constant γ1 > 0 such that for any d ≥ 0, we have
pi(λm/2− d) ≤ e−γ1d.
E.1 Proofs
First, we prove Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. We use a coupling technique to simplify the stochastic process. We use P
to denote the stochastic process governing the patient matching algorithm. Define the stochastic
process P ′′ to be the same as P, with the following differences in departures. In P ′′
1. E agents never leave the pool unless they have been matched, and
2. H agents do not stay in the pool: an H agent leaves the pool immediately with probability
e−m, without searching for a match. With probability 1− e−m she searches for a compatible
agent (upon arrival). If a match is found, both agents leave the pool. Otherwise, the H agent
leaves the pool.
We use the random variables x′′, y′′ to denote the number of H and E agents in P ′′. Recall that
we use the MC M to model P, and that pi denotes the steady-state distribution of M. We use
a similar MC, M′, to model P ′′ and use pi′′ to denote its steady-state distribution. We use piY to
denote the marginal distribution over y in pi. Similarly pi′′Y denotes the marginal distribution over
y′′ in pi′′.
The proof has two steps. In Step 1, we show that pi′′Y stochastically dominates piY. In Step 2,
we will show that there exists a constant σ′′Y > 0 such that for all y
′′ ≥ 0,
pi′′(y′′) ≤ e−σ′′Y ·y′′ .
This directly proves the lemma for σY = σ
′′
Y, because of the stochastic dominance relation proved
in Step 1.
Before proceeding to Step 1, we define a useful notation. Let xt, yt denote the number of H and
E agents in P at time t. Similarly, we use x′′t , y′′t to denote the number of H and E agents in P ′′ at
time t.
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Step 1 First, we define a mediator process, P ′, as follows. P ′ is the same as P, with the following
differences. In P ′
1. E agents never leave the pool unless they have been matched, and
2. Upon arrival, H agents draw the (exponential) random variable corresponding to their waiting
time. If this variable is larger than m, they leave the pool immediately without searching for
a match. Otherwise, the waiting time of the agent is set to be m, i.e., the agent stays in the
pool for m units of time and searches for a match upon departure.
We use the random variables x′, y′ to denote the number of H and E agents in P ′. Also, we use
pi′ to denote the steady-state distribution corresponding to the process P ′, and pi′Y to denote the
marginal distribution induced by pi over y′.
To complete Step 1, we will show that (i) pi′′Y stochastically dominates pi
′
Y, and (ii) pi
′
Y = piY.
Part (ii) is straightforward: P ′ is just the same as P except that the H agents who are allowed to
enter the pool in P ′ (those with waiting time shorter than m) will enter with a constant delay of
m. Since the delay is constant, the arrival process remains a Poisson process (with the same rate).
It remains to show that part (i) holds, i.e., pi′′Y stochastically dominates pi
′
Y.
The proof proceeds by defining a coupling of the processes P ′,P ′′. The joint process, denoted
by Q = (P ′,P ′′), will have two components corresponding to P ′,P ′′. This process Q, in addition
to being a valid coupling, will satisfy the following property: y′t ≤ y′′t+m for all t ≥ 0, in all sample
paths of Q. If Q satisfies this condition, then pi′′Y must stochastically dominate pi′Y, and we are done
with Step 1.38 So, all that remains is defining Q so that it satisfies the above-mentioned condition.
We define Q as follows. It starts with empty pools in both processes P,′ P ′′, i.e., x′t = y′t = x′′t =
y′′t = 0. Both processes will have identical sequences for the arrival of agents, but different departure
and matching processes. To define the matching process, we need some additional notation. Let
a′1 ≤ a′2 ≤ . . . be the sequence of departure times in P ′, i.e., a′i is the time that the ith arrival
happens in P ′. Also, let a′′1 ≤ a′′2 ≤ . . . be the sequence of departure times in P ′′. We make a final
notational convention: in case of departure of an H agent at time t, we use y′t to denote the number
of E agents just before that departure, i.e., y′t = limt∗→t− y′t∗ . The same definition holds for y′′t .39
First, note that
a′i ≤ a′′i ≤ a′i +m, ∀i ≥ 0. (33)
38Note that m is a constant with respect to t. Proving yt ≤ y′′t obviously implies the desired stochastic dominance
relation. Proving y′t ≤ y′′t+m is just as good, since shifting the sample paths y′′1 , y′′2 , . . . in time does not change the
stationary distribution of y′′.
39We use this convention since it allows us to conveniently distinguish between the departure process and the
matching process.
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This holds because P ′,P ′′ have the same arrival process; however, the departure of an agent in P ′′
can be delayed by up to m units of time, compared to her departure time in P ′.
The rest of the proof in Step 1 is straightforward. We couple P ′ and P ′′ in such a way that the
following property is satisfied: Upon the ith departure in P ′′, a compatible match is found iff (i) a
compatible match is found upon the ith departure in P ′, or (ii) y′′a′′i > y
′
a′i
. We label this property
Property ζ. If our coupling satisfies Property ζ, then we are done with Step 1: this fact, the fact
that P ′,P ′′ have the same arrival process, and (33) together would imply that y′t ≤ y′′t+m holds for
all t ≥ 0.
It remains to show that the coupling Q can be defined in a way that Property ζ is satisfied. This
is done inductively. The induction basis is i = 1. See that a′1 ≤ a′′1, and that y′a′1 ≤ y
′′
a′′1
. We consider
two cases: either y′a′1 = y
′′
a′′1
or y′a′1 < y
′′
a′′1
. If y′a′1 = y
′′
a′′1
, then we use the same compatibility graph for
the departing agent in both processes P ′,P ′′, i.e., the departing agent would be compatible with
another H agent in P ′, namely agent z, iff the departing agent is compatible with z in P ′′. It is
then clear that Property ζ would be satisfied in this case.
So, suppose that the case y′a′1 < y
′′
a′′1
holds. In this case, let z1, . . . , zk′ denote the H agents in P ′
at time a′1, where k′ = y′a′1 . Similarly, let z1, . . . , zk′′ denote the H agents in P
′′ at time a′′1, where
k′′ = y′′a′′1 . According to this notation, the first k
′ agents in P ′′ are the same agents as the k′ agents
in P ′. Indeed, our coupling treats these agents identically upon the ith departure in P ′,P ′′. This
guarantees that if the departing agent is matched to an agent z ∈ {z1, . . . , zk′} in P ′, then, the
departing agent will also be matched to z in P ′′. Therefore, Property ζ holds in this case as well.
To complete the induction, suppose that Property ζ holds for all departures before the ith
departure. In the induction step, we will show that Property ζ will be satisfied after the ith
departure. First, recall that a′i ≤ a′′i , by (33). This fact, together with the induction hypothesis,
implies that y′a′i ≤ y
′′
a′′i
. We consider two cases: either y′a′i = y
′′
a′′i
or y′a′i < y
′′
a′′i
. We define the coupling
for each case separately. This definition is identical to the definition of our coupling in the induction
basis. This completes the induction. Therefore, Property ζ holds, and Step 1 is complete.
Step 2 As we mentioned in the beginning of the proof, in this step we will show that there exists
a constant σ′′Y > 0 such that for all y
′′ ≥ 0,
pi′′(y′′) ≤ e−σ′′Y ·y′′ . (34)
Process P ′′ is an easily tractable process. The random variable y′′ evolves according to two
Poisson processes (Poisson clocks). The first clock is the arrival clock, which ticks with rate m;
upon each tick, the value of y′′ increases by 1. The second clock is the departure clock, which
ticks with rate (1 + λ)m(1− e−m); upon each tick, the value of y′′ decreases by 1 with probability
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1−My′′ .
Let y′′0 > 0 be a constant such that (1 + λ)My′′0 > 1 + λ/2. Therefore, for any y
′′ > y′′0 , the
balance equations imply that
pi′′(y′′ + 1)
pi′′(y′′)
≤ 1
1 + λ/2
.
The above equation, together with the fact that y0 is a constant, implies that there exists a constant
σ′′Y such that (34) holds. This finishes Step 2 and completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 8. Note that for any x ≤ λm/2, by the balance equations we have
pi(x+ 1)
pi(x)
≤ x+m
(1 + λ)m
≤ 1 + λ/2
1 + λ
.
Letting γ1 =
1+λ/2
1+λ proves the claim.
E.2 Match rate under patient matching
Lemma 9. Under patient matching, the match rate of hard-to-match agents is 11+λ −O( 1(1+λ)√m)
and the match rate of easy-to-match agents is 1− o(1).
Proof. Let mE = m and mH = (1 + λ)m. We use E
P
t , H
P
t respectively to denote the number of E,
H agents under the patient policy at time t. Let EP , HP denote the average (steady-state) number
of E, H agents under the patient policy, respectively. Also, let the steady-state number of matches
between E and H agents be denoted by a random variable Meh.
We will show that E [Meh] = m−O(
√
m). This would prove the claim on the match rates of E
and H agents. To this end, we define an event F , as follows. Consider an E agent upon her arrival,
namely agent a. Let F be the event in which a is matched with another E agent. Suppose t denotes
the time when a’s departure clock is set to tick (which is determined by a draw from Exp(1), right
after her arrival). Let G be the event in which a leaves the pool at time t, while being matched to
another E agent. See that
P [F ] ≤ 2P [G] . (35)
This holds because any match between two E agents is formed upon the departure of one of them.
(In the above inequality, the probabilities are unconditional steady-state probabilities, i.e., the
probabilities are not conditional on the state of the pool that a enters to, the waiting time of a, or
compatibility of a to the other agents.)
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Next, we will show that P [G] = o(1). This holds essentially by Lemma 8. Roughly speaking,
this lemma says that the steady-state H pool is large, and therefore, a is compatible with an H
agent wvhp. This would imply that F holds wvlp. More precisely, Lemma 8 is applicable since
the marginal distribution of the size of the H pool just before an E departure (conditional on an
E departure) is equal to the unconditional marginal steady-state distribution of the size of the H
pool.40 (This is a consequence of the PASTA property.) Therefore, Lemma 8 is applicable and
would imply that, wvhp, the size of the H pool is at least λm/4 upon the departure of a. Therefore,
wvhp, a is compatible with at least one of the H agents in the pool. This means G happens wvlp.
This fact and (35) together imply that there exists a constant η > 0 such that
P [F ] ≤ e−ηm.
The above equation and linearity of expectation together imply that E [Meh] ≥ m − e−ηm, which
means E [Meh] = m−O(
√
m). (Note that E [Meh] ≤ m.)
E.3 Distribution of waiting time
Lemma 10. Under the patient policy, as m converges to infinity, the waiting time and matching
time of an E agent converge in distribution to the degenerate distribution at 0.
Proof. Fix an E agent, e, and let we denote the waiting time of e. For any fixed constant t > 0, we
will show that limm→∞ P [t > we] = 0. This will prove the claim. First, see that
E [we] =
1
m
· E(x,y)∼pi [x] =
1
m
·O(1)
where the second equality is by Theorem 4. Therefore, by Markov inequality,
P [we > t] < O(t/m)
holds, which means limm→∞ P [t > we] = 0.
Lemma 11. Under the patient policy, as m converges to infinity, the waiting time and matching
time of an H agent converge in distribution to an exponential random variable with rate 1.
Proof. Fix an H agent, namely h, upon arrival. Let Eh denote the event in which agent h receives
no offers before his departure clock ticks. More precisely, Eh denotes the event in which no E agent
40Recall that an E departure denotes the event of the departure of an E agent, whether because the agent is
matched or because the agent’s departure clock has ticked.
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will check to see whether agent h is compatible with him.41 To prove the lemma, it is enough to
show that
lim
m→∞P [Eh]→ 0. (36)
Claim 4. If (36) holds, then the waiting time and matching time of an H agent converge in
distribution to an exponential random variable with rate 1.
Proof. Let w denote the waiting time of h and let d denote the time that his departure clock is set
to tick (which will be set upon the arrival of h). Note that for any t we have
P [d < t] ≤ P [w < t] ≤ P [d < t] + P [(d > t) ∧ Eh]
≤ P [d < t] + P [Eh] .
The above inequality and (36) together imply that
lim
m→∞P [w < t] = P [d < t] ,
which proves the claim.
To prove that (36) holds, we slightly modify the stochastic process after the arrival of h. Let Q
denote the original process, which starts upon the arrival of h, namely at time t0, and ends when
h leaves the system. The modified process, namely Q′, is similar to Q, except for the differences
clarified below. Roughly speaking, Q′ is the same as the patient matching process with the exception
that the arrival of h is “ignored” in the sense that h does not interfere with the evolution of Q′.
• Q′ runs from time t0 to t0 + logm. Furthermore, the departure clock of h is set to tick at
time t0 + logm in Q′.
• By definition, Q′ has a sample path identical to Q, until one of the following disjoint events
happens:
Event (i) h receives an offer in Q before time t0 + logm. In this case, we stop Q. In
Q′, h rejects the received offer as well as all of the offers that she will receive in
the future. Any E agent who gets rejected by h will make an offer to the next
41We are implicitly assuming that E agents, upon departure, search for a compatible match by first visiting H
agents one by one, and match with the first compatible agent. This is of course without loss of generality, by the
principle of deferred decisions.
55
compatible agent in his (random) list. Q′ will continue evolving according to the
patient matching process, with the exception of agent h, who does not interfere
with the process.
Event (ii) The departure clock of h ticks in Q before time t0 +logm, and no offers are made
to h prior her departure. In this case, we stop Q but continue to run Q′. Q′ will
continue evolving according to the patient matching process, with the exception
of agent h, who does not interfere with the process (i.e., agent h rejects all the
offers she receives, in the sense clarified above).
• We stop Q′ when it reaches the time t0 + logm.
Let E′h denote the event in which h receives at least one offer in Q′ before time t0 + logm. A
straightforward coupling argument shows that
P [Eh] ≤ P
[
E′h
]
+ e− logm.
Therefore, to prove that (36) holds, it is enough to show that
lim
m→∞P
[
E′h
]→ 0. (37)
Our approach for proving (37) is as follows. First, we observe that, when the arrival of h is
ignored, the process Q′ can be run from time t0 to t0 + logm as follows: sample a state (x, y) ∼ pi.
Then, let the stochastic system start from (x, y) and evolve for logm units of time, under the
patient policy. By the PASTA property, the sample paths generated by this process are identical
to the sample paths of Q′ (when the arrival of h is ignored).
By the above argument, we sample the state (x, y) ∼ pi at time t0 and let the process run until
time t0 + logm. We also consider an “imaginary agent” h, which exists in the H pool, but rejects
all of the proposals that are made to her. Our goal is showing that the probability that h receives
at least one proposal over the period [t0, t0 + logm], which we denoted by P [E′h], approaches 0 as
m approaches infinity.
Without loss of generality, let t0 = 0 and t = logm for notational simplicity. Let Ht denote the
history of the process until time t. (Note that the history does not include the offers made to h,
since this agent does not change the evolution of the process.) Let the random variable nt denote
the number of E agents whose departure clock ticks in the interval [0, t]. Also, let d1, . . . , dnt denote
the times that the departure clocks of these agents tick. Define x1, . . . , xnt to be the number of H
agents in the pool at times d1, . . . , dnt , respectively.
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First, see that
P
[
E¯h
∣∣Ht] ≥ Πnti=1(1− 1/xi). (38)
In the rest of the proof, we will use probabilistic bounds to show that in almost all histories Ht,
nt is small and x
∗ is large, where x∗ = min{x1, . . . , xnt}. These two facts, together with (38), will
finish the proof.
Define event G1 as
x∗ > λm/4.
The goal is to show that G¯1 happens wvlp. For this, we will show that the size of the E pool after
the arrival of any E agent is small, wvhp. Formally, we can use the PASTA property together with
Lemma 8 and write a union bound over all arrivals of E agents in the interval [0, t]. This implies
that
P
[
G¯1
]
= O(mte−γ3m), (39)
where γ3 = λγ2/2.
Define event G2 as nt < t logm. By Theorem 4, E [nt] = O(t). Therefore, by Markov inequality,
P
[
G¯2
]
= O(1/ logm). (40)
Now, recall (38), and that our goal is to show that in almost all histories Ht, nt is small and
x∗ is large. (39) and (40) show just this. More formally, they imply that in almost all histories Ht
but a fraction O(1/ logm) of them, events G1, G2 hold. Therefore, using (38), we can write
P
[
E¯h
] ≥ (1−O(1/logm)) · (1− 1
λm/4.
)t logm
, (41)
≥ (1−O(1/logm)) ·
(
1− t logm
λm/4.
)
= 1− o(1), (42)
which implies that P [Eh] = o(1). This completes the proof.
F Proof of Proposition 3, Part (ii)
We break the proof into four parts: Proposition 9 and Proposition 10 prove the bounds on the
match rate and waiting time of H agents, and Proposition 11 and Proposition 12 prove the bounds
on the match rate and waiting time of E agents. These propositions are stated and proved after
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the following preliminary analysis.
Suppose that time is indexed by real numbers and starts from 0. The batching policy makes
matches every T units of time. Define round i to be the time window between time (i − 1)T + 1
right after the matches are made (if any) and time iT right before the matches are made.
To give an upper bound on the match rate of the batching policy, we can analyze a simpler
process instead, which we call process B and define as follows. B is similar to the original batching
policy, with the following differences:
1. Easy-to-match nodes are not compatible.
2. The probability of compatibility between an easy-to-match node and a hard-to-match node
is 1.
A straightforward coupling argument shows that the match rate of H agents in B is smaller and
their (average) waiting time larger than in the batching policy. (This holds in each sample path
of the coupled process.) Therefore, to provide the promised bounds for H agents in the batching
policy, it suffices to analyze the simpler process, B. All the following definitions are therefore
defined for the process B.
Let Ei, Hi respectively denote the number of E agents and H agents at the beginning of round
i. Let Xi = Hi −Ei. (Note that Ei ·Hi = 0 must always hold.) It is straightforward to verify that
C = 〈(E1, H1), (E2, H2), . . .〉 is an ergodic Markov chain with its state space being the set of pairs
of non-negative integers. Let pi denote the steady-state distribution of C.
Let E′i, H
′
i respectively denote the number of E agents and H agents who were present in the
pool both at the beginning and at the end of round i . Define X ′i = H
′
i −E′i. Moreover, let E′′i , H ′′i
respectively denote the number of E agents and H agents who arrived after the beginning of round
i and were present in the pool at the end of round i. Define X ′′i = H
′′
i − E′′i .
Next, observe that
Xi+1 = X
′
i +X
′′
i . (43)
Taking expectation (with respect to the stationary distribution pi) from both sides of the above
equality implies that
Epi [Xi+1] = Epi
[
X ′i
]
+ Epi
[
X ′′i
]
. (44)
We will compute Epi [Xi] using the above equation and the following observations.
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First, observe that
Epi
[
X ′i
]
= Epi
[
H ′i
]− Epi [E′i] = Epi [Xi] · e−γT , (45)
where γ = 1/d. This equality holds simply because an agent who is present at the beginning of
round i will also be present at the end of round i with probability e−γT .
Let Ni denote the number of arrivals. Second, observe that
Epi
[
X ′′i
]
= Epi
[
H ′′i
]− Epi [E′′i ]
=
n=∞∑
n=1
P
[
H ′′i = n
] · n · ∫ T
0
1
T
· e−γ(T−t) d t−
n=∞∑
n=1
P
[
E′′i = n
] · n · ∫ T
0
1
T
· e−γ(T−t) d t
=
∫ T
0
1
T
· e−γ(T−t) d t · (Epi [H ′′i ]− Epi [E′′i ]) = ( 1T − e−γTT ) · λmT/γ. (46)
We then can use (44), (45), and (46) to write
Epi [Xi+1] = Epi [Xi] · e−γT + ( 1
T
− e
−γT
T
) · λmT/γ.
We can simplify the above equation further using the fact that Epi [Xi+1] = Epi [Xi], which holds
since pi is the steady-state distribution:
Epi [Xi] =
( 1T − e
−γT
T ) · λmT/γ
1− e−γT = λm/γ. (47)
Next, we use (47) to compute an upper bound on the match rate of H agents under the batching
policy. Equivalently, we compute a lower bound on the death rate of H agents, where the death
rate is the expected fractions of H agents per unit of time who depart the market without getting
matched. To this end, we just need to compute the expected number of such departures (i.e.,
deaths) per round.
Fix a round i and let Di denote the number of deaths in round i. The expected number of
deaths of H agents during round i is just equal to the expected number of H agents who were
present at the beginning of round i but not at the end, plus the expected number of H agents who
arrived sometime in round i but were not present at the end of round i. That is,
Epi [Di] = Epi
[
max{Xi, 0} · (1− e−γT )
]
+ (1 + λ)mT · (1− 1
γT
+
e−γT
γT
). (48)
Verify that the second summand on the right-hand-side is indeed the expected number of H agents
who arrived sometime in round i but were not present at the end of round i by the following
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equality:
n=∞∑
n=1
P
[
H ′′i = n
] · n · ∫ T
0
1
T
· (1− e−γ(T−t)) d t = (1 + λ)mT · (1− 1
γT
+
e−γT
γT
).
We now can use (48) to write the inequality
Epi [Di] ≥ Epi [Xi] · (1− e−γT ) + (1 + λ)mT · (1− 1
γT
+
e−γT
γT
),
which can be simplified using (47) to
Epi [Di] ≥ λm/γ · (1− e−γT ) + (1 + λ)mT · (1− 1
γT
+
e−γT
γT
). (49)
The above inequality implies
Epi [Di]
(1 + λ)mT
≥ λ(1− e
−γT )
(1 + λ)Tγ
+ (1− 1
γT
+
e−γT
γT
)
which is the promised lower bound on the death rate of H agents (i.e., the left-hand-side of the
above inequality). This implies that the match rate of the H agents is bounded from above by
1− e−γT
γT
− λ(1− e
−γT )
(1 + λ)γT
. (50)
Proposition 9. Fix T > 0. There exists a constant r < 11+λ such that for any m,λ > 0, the match
rate of H agents under the batching policy is smaller than r.
Proof. The proof uses the upper bound (50) on the match rate of the batching policy. Let u denote
this upper bound. We will show that u < 11+λ holds for any m,λ > 0. Simple algebra reveals that
this is equivalent to showing that
1 + eγT (−1 + γT ) > 0. (51)
Let the left-hand-side of (51) be denoted by f(T ). Observe that f(T ) is strictly increasing in T
since f ′(T ) = γ2TeT > 0. Since f(0) = 0 and T > 0, then f(T ) > 0. This proves the claim.
Proposition 10. Fix T > 0. There exists a constant r > λ1+λ such that for any m,λ > 0, the
expected waiting time of H agents under the batching policy is larger than r.
Proof. Let Wi denote the waiting time incurred by all H agents in round i. The expected waiting
time of H agents is just equal to Epi [Wi](1+λ)mT . We therefore prove the claim by computing a lower
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bound on Epi [Wi]. Observe that
Epi [Wi] = Epi
[
W ′i
]
+ Epi
[
W ′′i
]
, (52)
where W ′i denotes the waiting time incurred in round i by the H agents who were present at the
beginning of round i and W ′′i denotes the waiting time incurred in round i by the H agents who
were not present at the beginning of round i.
Verify that
Epi
[
W ′i
]
= Epi [max{Xi, 0}] ·
(∫ T
0
γte−γt d t+ Te−γT
)
≥ λm(1− e−γT )/γ2, (53)
where the left-hand-side is the product of the expected number of H agents that are present at the
beginning of round i and the expected waiting time incurred by any such agent in round i. Also,
verify that
Epi
[
W ′′i
]
= (1 + λ)mT ·
(∫ T
0
1
T
(∫ T−s
0
γte−γt d t+ (T − s)e−γ(T−s)
)
d s
)
= (1 + λ)m(e−γT + γT − 1)/γ2, (54)
where on the right-hand-side of the first equality the first term is the expected number of H agents
who arrive sometime in round i and the second term is the expected waiting time that each such
agent incurs. The second equality follows from simple calculations.
We now can use (52), (53), and (54) to write the following lower bound on the waiting time of
batching policies:
Epi [Wi]
(1 + λ)mT
≥ γT (1 + λ) + e
−γT − 1
γ2(λ+ 1)T
. (55)
Simple algebra shows that the right-hand-side of the above inequality is larger than λ/γ1+λ if and only
if
1 + eγT (−1 + γT ) > 0.
Let the LHS of the above inequality be denoted by f(T ). Observe that f(T ) is strictly increasing in
T since f ′(T ) = γ2TeT > 0. Since f(0) = 0 and T > 0, then f(T ) > 0. This proves the claim.
Proposition 11. Fix T > 0. The match rate of E agents is at most 1−e
−γT
γT .
Proof. First we compute the chance that an E agent who arrives during round i does not become
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critical before round i ends: ∫ T
0
1
T
e−γt d t =
1− e−γT
γT
.
This implies that, conditioned on arriving in period i, an E agent does not get matched with
probability at least 1− 1−e−γTγT . This proves the claim.
Proposition 12. Fix T > 0. The waiting time of E agents is at least 1γ − 1−e
−γT
γ2T
.
Proof. We compute the expected waiting time that an E agent who arrives in round i incurs during
round i: ∫ T
0
1
T
·
(∫ T−s
0
γte−γt d t+ (T − s)e−γ(T−s)
)
d s =
e−γT + γT − 1
γ2T
=
1
γ
− 1− e
−γT
γ2T
.
This proves the claim.
G Few Hard-to-Match Agents (λ < 0)
For completeness we analyze the behavior of the patient and greedy matching policies when λ < 0.
Theorem 5. Let λ ∈ [−1, 0).
1. The match rate for all agents is 1−O(1/m) under both policies.
2. Under greedy matching, the expected waiting time and matching time of H agents are O(1/m),
and the expected waiting time and matching time of E agents are O
(
logm1/(1−p)
m
)
.
3. Under patient matching, the expected waiting time and matching time of H agents are O(1/m);
moreover, the distribution of waiting time and matching time of E agents converge to the
exponential random variable with mean 11−λ .
We omit the proof of this theorem. It is a simpler version of the proof of Theorem 1.
H Simulations Based on the Stylized Model
This section presents simulation results based on the stylized model. The findings illustrate that the
theoretical predictions hold even in small markets. As in the model, no two hard-to-match agents
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are compatible with each other. Every two easy-to-match agents are compatible with probability
q = 0.04, independently. Every pair of easy-to-match and hard-to-match agents is compatible
with probability p = 0.1, independently. The choice of these probabilities is motivated from some
components of the kidney exchange pool.42 43
Other parameters of the model are set as follows. Agents arrive according to a Poisson process
with an average of 1 per time period (day) and become critical according to an exponential distri-
bution with mean 200 days.44 We set λ = 0.5 in the first set of simulations and then vary λ. Both
the greedy and patient matching policies are simulated until 70, 000 agents arrive and the waiting
and matching times are recorded for all but the first 5000 agents.45
Under the greedy policy the waiting time and matching time distributions of hard-to-match
agents fit exponential distributions with means 64.63 and 64.6, respectively, where the mean pre-
dicted by Proposition 3 (albeit in a thick enough market) is λ1+λ · 200 ≈ 66.66. The empirical
distribution of waiting times, the empirical distribution of matching times, and the CDF of the
exponential distribution with mean 66.66 are depicted in Figure 13 (note that they almost coincide).
Under the patient policy the waiting time and matching time distributions of hard-to-match
agents fit exponential distributions with means 189.09 and 190.12, respectively. Figure 13 also plots
these empirical distributions, as well as the exponential distribution with mean 200 (here too, the
CDFs almost coincide).
The fraction of hard-to-match agents that are matched is approximately 0.67 under both poli-
cies, the fraction of easy-to-match agents that are matched is approximately 1 under both policies,
and in particular, almost all easy-to-match agents are matched with hard-to-match agents.
42Consider patient-donor pairs with pair of blood types A-O, respectively, and O-A pairs. Since the donor and the
patient of an A-O pair are ABO compatible, the patient is likely to be sensitized and thus two O-A pairs will have a
low chance of being compatible with each other. Since the donor of an O-A pair is ABO incompatible, the patient is
less sensitized, and therefore such a pair has a higher probability to being compatible with an A-O pair.
43This choice of parameters is also interesting because it shows that the convergence rates are fast even when p > q,
and even faster for larger q, e.g., when p = 0.04, q = 0.1.
44When no matches are made at all, the expected pool size is therefore about 200. Typical kidney exchange
networks are fairly thicker; for example, recall the estimates for arrival and departure rates from our data set in
Section 4 (i.e., 1 arrival per day and a departure rate of 1/360). According to these estimates, when no matches are
made, the expected pool size would be 360.
45We ignore the first 5000 agents to ensure that our samples are taken when the stochastic process is (almost) in
the steady state, i.e., the corresponding Markov chain is mixed.
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Figure 13: Waiting time and matching time distributions under the greedy and patient policies for λ = 0.5.
Table 2 presents similar results for different values of λ, while fixing the total arrival rate to 200.
The values of λ are derived by setting the fraction of easy-to-match agents arriving to the pool (i.e.,
1
2+λ) to 0.25, 0.35 and 0.45, which respectively correspond to λ = 2, λ = 0.857, and λ = 0.222. For
any type of agent Θ ∈ {E,H}, let WT (Θ) be the average waiting time of matched agents of type
Θ, MT (Θ) be the average matching time of agents of type Θ, and M(Θ) be the fraction of agents
of type Θ who match. Also let MˆT (Θ) be the estimated average matching time of type Θ that is
obtained by applying the limit result of Proposition 3, i.e., MˆT (E) = 0 and MˆT (H) = λ1+λ · 200.
Although the formal limit result holds when m approaches infinity, it can be used to estimate the
matching time for small m. As Table 2 shows, these estimates are reasonably close to the empirical
average matching time and the average waiting time.
Policy λ MT(H) WT(H) MˆT (H) MT(E) WT(E) MˆT (E) M(H) M(E)
Patient 0.222 181.8 182.4 200 18.9 18.9 0 0.814 0.99
Greedy 0.222 36.31 36.87 36.36 0.28 0.29 0 0.82 1
Patient 0.857 188.9 192.7 200 10.43 10.43 0 0.54 1
Greedy 0.857 92.5 92.7 92.3 0 0 0 0.54 1
Patient 2 191.3 196.3 200 7.43 7.43 0 0.33 1
Greedy 2 132.6 132.8 133.3 0 0 0 0.33 1
Table 2: Statistics for the stylized model for different values of λ.
The waiting time and matching time distributions follow exponential distributions with the
corresponding averages reported in Table 2 (plots are omitted). Note that under the patient policy
the average waiting time and the average matching time of hard-to-match agents are similar for all
values of λ and are close to the predicted waiting time, 200, which is the exogenous average time,
in which hard-to-match agents become critical. Under greedy matching, for each λ the average
waiting time and average matching time for hard-match-agents are similar and are close to the
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predicted values, 200 · λ1+λ .
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